

31 OCTOBER 1946

I N D E X
of
WITNESSES
(none)

I N D E X
of
EXHIBITS

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Pros. No.</u>	<u>Def. No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For Ident.</u>	<u>In Evidence</u>
1555- I	879		"Tokyo Gazette" Vol. V No. 8 dated February 1942 re The 78th Session of the Imperial Diet (Ministerial Addresses of 16 December 1941) Address by the Prime Minister, General Hideki TOJO	9073	
1555- I-A	879-A		Excerpts therefrom		9073
2521	880		"The Total Strength of the Japanese Army"		9074
1756- H	881		Excerpt from "Japan Year Book 1941-42" Chapter XLIII "South Sea Islands Under Japan's Mandate - Geo- graphical Features"		9077
-	882		Copies of a map prepared and issued by the American Army Map Service showing Mandated Islands of Japan and their situation with respect to other countries		9079

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6022	883		Deposition of Manuel Ilanco		9089
6024	884		ditto MAKOTO Wakamatsu		9091
6019	885		ditto Ignacio Benavente		9092
6020	886		ditto Elias P. Sablan		9093
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1 Thursday, 31 October, 1946

2 - - -

3
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
5 FOR THE FAR EAST
6 Court House of the Tribunal
7 War Ministry Building
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12
13 Appearances:

14 For the Tribunal, same as before, with the
15 exception of the HONORABLE R. B. PAL, Member from
16 India, not sitting.

17 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

18 For the Defense Section, same as before.

19
20 - - -

21
22 (English to Japanese and Japanese
23 to English interpretation was made by the
24 Language Section, IMTIF.)
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present
4 except OKAWA and HIRANUMA, who are represented by
5 their respective counsel.

6 We have a certificate from the medical
7 superintendent of Sugamo Prison to the effect that
8 HIRANUMA is ill and unable to attend the trial today.
9 The certificate is recorded and will be filed.

10 Mr. Logan.

11 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, in
12 addition to the arguments submitted yesterday, I
13 wish to point out further that there is contained
14 within this document 1628 summaries of statements
15 made by a prisoner, and the translation service even
16 goes so far as to evaluate the information which the
17 prisoner gave. On page 1 of the document there is
18 contained a summary and conclusions, and also on
19 page 51, your Honors will note right in the inception
20 of that page, under the heading of "Conclusions," a
21 statement to this effect:
22

23 "The Imperial Japanese Government had
24 positively committed itself to the waging of war
25 against the United States of America, Great Britain.
and the Netherlands by the end of October, 1941."

1 That conclusion is based purely on certain
2 information contained in the document, and it is a
3 decision on an issue which is seriously and vigorously
4 contested by these defendants. While the introduction
5 of this document may be a convenient method for the
6 prosecution to prove its case, we do not believe that
7 convenience should be considered in a case of this
8 type; and we strongly urge the Tribunal to reject
9 this report, particularly on the ground that it is
10 issued by the reviewing authority in this case.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will not
12 regard this report as providing a short cut for its
13 verdicts. We will not accept any conclusions in
14 that report except in so far as they are conclusions
15 on matters requiring expert knowledge and are given
16 by experts. We understand that in no part of the
17 report is there any attempt to decide any issue.
18 However, I will ask my colleagues whether they think
19 it should be admitted. I have not discussed it with
20 them individually yet.

21 . The position is summed up in a note I have
22 received from a colleague. We will admit it for
23 its factual contents, and not for its comments or
24 conclusions, which will be ignored.
25

MR. ENGLISH: Will the Clerk assign an

1 exhibit number to this document?

2 THE PRESIDENT: It has been admitted already.

3 MR. ENGLISH: The exhibit number is 809.

4 CLERK OF THE COURT: 809.

5 MR. ENGLISH: I will commence reading from
6 page 1, Section 1.

7 "CHRONOLOGY OF JAPANESE MILITARY PREPARATIONS,
8 JANUARY 1941 -- 8 DECEMBER 1941.

9 "1. INTRODUCTION.

10 "a. General.

11 "Japanese preparations for the 'War for
12 Greater East Asia' far antedate the actual outbreak
13 of hostilities on 8 December 1941. Available
14 references --

15 MR. LOGAN: In accordance with your Honor's
16 ruling just now, I submit that is a conclusion.

17 THE PRESIDENT: I think to present the
18 position intelligibly, it may be necessary even to
19 touch upon conclusions, assuming it be one -- I am
20 not quite sure. But the Tribunal, of course, will
21 disregard anything in the nature of conclusions.
22

23 Wedged in among the conclusions there may
24 be, of course, statements of fact which we would
25 admit. I think you had better proceed as you in-
tended, Mr. English.

1 MR. ENGLISH (Reading continued): "Available
2 references documenting these preparations are as yet
3 fragmentary, especially in respect to specialized
4 training operations in tropical warfare reputed to
5 have taken place throughout the summer and fall of
6 1941. As the date of the opening of hostilities is
7 approached, however, pertinent references grow more
8 plentiful, until for the month of November 1941 it is
9 possible to piece together a fairly comprehensive
10 picture of Japanese military preparations. The main
11 aspects of these preparations which have been es-
12 tablished to date (1 January 1945) are as follows:"

13 I will turn to page 3, paragraph b.

14 "b. Organization of Material.

15 "The evidence upon which the foregoing
16 summary is based is set forth in full in the follow-
17 ing paragraphs. References have been arranged
18 chronologically in accordance with the date of the
19 most significant entry contained in the diary or
20 other captured document under examination.

21 "In order further to clarify the sequence
22 of Japanese military preparations, a table setting
23 forth a day by day breakdown of significant activities
24 for the period 10 October -- 7 December, 1941 has
25 been included as Appendix A."

1 I will turn to page 12, paragraph 6.

2 "10 OCTOBER 1941

3 "a. Preparation for Landing Operations

4 A 'Report on Conditions' issued by Lieu-
5 tenant-Colonel RYUTO, Commanding Officer of 42
6 Anchorage Group, dated 15 June 1942, states that:

7 "'Record of General Situation since Mobi-
8 lization.

9 "'The mobilization order was issued on
10 12 September 1941. Organization from the Hiroshima
11 Western District No 2 Force was completed by 17
12 September. We left UJINA on 29 September, sailing
13 to OSAKA where 40 Sea Duty Company was attached to
14 us. We left OSAKA on 1 October and reached our
15 destination at PALAU on 10 October where we estab-
16 lished an anchorage headquarters. Then we made
17 preparations for the landing operations which were
18 to accompany the War for Greater East Asia.'

19 "12 OCTOBER 1941

20 "a. Preparation for Malayan Operation

21 "Personal history register of Leading
22 Private KASHINO, Hisazo of 41 Infantry Regiment
23 contains the following entries:

24 "'10 October 1941 - Left NINGPO

25 "'11 October - Landed at SHANGHAI

1 "'12 October to 14 November - Prepared for MALAYAN
2 operations in the vicinity of SHANGHAI.

3 "'22 November - Left WOCSUNG, SHANGHAI, 8 December -
4 Landed at SINGORA, THAILAND.'

5 "'4 NOVEMBER 1941

6 "a. Preparation for Jungle Warfare

7 "Diary belonging to unknown member of
8 41 Infantry Regiment contains the entries quoted
9 below. 41 Infantry Regiment participated in the
10 attack on MALAYA, which was mounted from the port
11 of SAMU on HAINAN Island.

12 "'12 October 1941 - Reached WOOSUNG Pier and returned
13 to KIANCWAU Barracks.

14 "'23 October - OKABE Force was assembled and heard
15 an address from a newly appointed brigade commander,
16 Major General KAWAMURA, Saburo. There will be a
17 general inspection of the three battalions to-
18 morrow.

19 "'4 November - Jungle combat training for expected
20 type warfare.

21 "'13 November - Received rations and other necessary
22 items for tropical combat (medicines and clothing,
23 etc).

24 "'20 November - Anchored off-shore HAIKOW on HAINAN
25 Island

1 "12 December - Weighed anchor and sailed again
2 for SAMOA.

3 "15 December - Assisted by our guns and tanks, our
4 unit was the first to enter GUBUN Street. Captain
5 OMORI, First Lieutenant NIKKI and Second Lieutenant
6 TAKAHASHI were killed. First Lieutenant OKANO and
7 YANAGIZAWA were wounded.'

8 "10 NOVEMBER 1941

9 "It is stated on the cover of the below-
10 quoted pamphlet entitled, 'Just Read This and the
11 War is Won', that a copy is to be issued to each
12 Japanese soldier before he embarks for overseas.
13 The frontispiece consists of a map of SOUTH CHINA,
14 FRENCH INDO-CHINA, THAILAND, BURMA, the FEDERATED
15 MALAY States, the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES, and a
16 small section of the Northwest Australian Coast.
17 The date of publication of the pamphlet is not
18 definitely known. A captured copy, however, is
19 stamped by 55 Division Infantry Group as having
20 been received on 10 November 1941 (Elements of
21 55 Division figured prominently in the attack on
22 GUAM and in the BURMA Campaign during December 1941.).
23 Furthermore, its length and the nature of the con-
24 tents are such as to indicate original preparation
25 as a date considerably prior to this. Pertinent

1 sections of this pamphlet are reproduced below:

2 "'"What sort of place is the southern field
3 of operations?

4 "'"(1) It is the treasury of the Orient
5 which has been invaded by the white men of ENGLAND,
6 AMERICA, FRANCE and HOLLAND.

7 "'"(2) One hundred million Orientals are
8 being oppressed by three hundred thousand white men.

9 "'"It amounts to this - these whites possess
10 scores of Oriental slaves from the moment they are
11 born. Is this the intention of God?

12 "'"(3) It is a source of world supply of
13 oil, rubber, tin, etc.

14 "'"Rubber and tin are essential for military
15 supplies and for these valuable resources the southern
16 countries are the most plentiful in the East. The
17 malevolence of ENGLAND and AMERICA, who have prevented
18 JAPAN's purchasing these materials by just means, is
19 one of the reasons which necessitates the present
20 military operations.

21 "'"It is quite clear that the NETHERLANDS
22 EAST INDIES and FRENCH INDO-CHINA cannot oppose
23 JAPAN alone, but with the support and threats of
24 ENGLAND and AMERICA they are showing hostility to
25 JAPAN. The lack of oil and iron is JAPAN's weak

1 point, but lack of rubber, tin and tungsten is the
2 weakest point of AMERICA. AMERICA's chief sources
3 of supply of these is from the SOUTH SEAS and
4 Southern CHINA. If these could be stopped, it
5 not only would enable JAPAN to obtain the much-
6 wanted oil and tin but it would stick a knife into
7 AMERICA's sorest spot. The essence of AMERICA's
8 opposition to JAPAN's southward advance lies here.

9 "(4) It is a land of perpetual summer.

10 "Bananas and pineapples are plentiful
11 all the year round; at the same time troublesome
12 malarial-mosquitoes are everywhere. In the JAVA
13 and SINGAPORE Areas motor roads have been developed
14 everywhere, but there are many uncivilized places,
15 jungles and swamps where neither man nor animals
16 pass.

17 "Why must we fight and how must we fight?

18 "(1) By the Imperial Will for the peace
19 of the Orient.

20 "The MEIJI Restoration saved JAPAN from
21 invasion by foreign powers. The SHOWA Restoration,
22 by complying with the Imperial Will for the peace
23 of the Orient, must rescue Asiatics from disputes
24 amongst themselves and the invasion of the white
25 race and return ASIA to the Asiatics. Peace in

1 ASIA will ensue and this will be followed by peace
2 in the world being firmly established.

3 "JAPAN is given a great mission to save
4 MANCHURIA from the design of SOVIET RUSSIA, free
5 CHINA from exploitation by the ENGLISH and AMERICANS,
6 and then aid the independence of THAILAND, ANNAM and
7 the PHILIPPINES, thus to bring about the happiness
8 of the natives of the SOUTH SEAS and INDIA. This
9 is the spirit of equality and brotherhood.

10 "(2) While destroying the enemy show
11 compassion towards those without crime.

12 "Understanding this war as one between
13 races, we must enforce our just demands on the
14 Europeans, excluding Germans and Italians, without
15 extenuation.

16 "(3) Is the enemy stronger than the
17 Chinese Army?
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 "Comparing the enemy with the Chinese Army,
2 since the officers are Europeans and noncommissioned
3 officers for the greater part natives, the spiritual
4 unity throughout the army is zero. It must be borne
5 in mind that the number of airplanes, tanks and guns
6 are far superior to those of the Chinese Army. How-
7 ever, not only are these of old types but their users
8 are weak soldiers so they are not of much use. Con-
9 sequently night attack is what the enemy fears most.

10 "(A) We must be prepared for the war to
11 be a prolonged affair and proceed with every prepara-
12 tion for a drawn out conflict.

13 "What course will the war follow?

14 "Long voyage followed by landing operations.

15 "All fields of operations are in the SOUTH
16 SEAS over a thousand miles from FORMOSA. Some places
17 take a week to ten days to reach. This wide sea is
18 crossed by convoys of several hundred warships and
19 merchantmen. Looking back, our ancestors conquered
20 this rough sea and carried on trade and fought with
21 wooden sailing ships hundreds of years ago. After sev-
22 eral days journey in the confines of shipboard, enemy
23 resistance on the shores must be overcome and landings
24 enforced.
25

"What to do aboard ship: "

1 "The most important thing in landing op-
2 erations is the maintenance of secrecy. If the enemy
3 gets to know in advance where we plan to land, it will
4 be very difficult.

5 "There are many instances where a simple
6 thing written in a letter has been the cause of the
7 defeat of a whole army, or where a word dropped over
8 a glass of wine in a cafe just before departure has
9 been the cause of secrets coming to the ears of spies.

10 "Remember how the 47 RONIN kept their secret
11 through such trials until they had avenged their Lord;
12 encourage one another to do likewise.

13 "There is a timely story of a soldier at-
14 tached to a certain unit, who, landed in Southern
15 CHINA during the present Incident, wrote a letter and
16 dropped it in the sea, sealed in a bottle. The
17 letter was carried by the tide to the coast of KOREA.
18 Supposing the letter had reached VLADIVOSTOK--what
19 would have been the consequence? Often a clue is
20 caught by aircraft and submarines which are at sea to
21 find out the movements of our transport ships. Care
22 must be observed in the disposal of dirt and rubbish.

23 "Bottle:

24 "(1) Squalls, mist and night are over all.

25 "Europeans are dandies, and delicate and

1 cowardly. Therefore, rain, mist and night attacks
2 are the things they detest most. They consider night
3 suitable only for dances but not for fighting--we
4 must take advantage of this.

5 " (2) Unlike the Chinese soldiers, our pres-
6 ent enemy may use gas. If you cast aside your gas
7 mask because of the torment of wearing it in the
8 heat, the consequence may be serious.

9 " Action in particular zones:

10 " Action in swamps and paddy-fields:

11 " FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND are, next
12 to JAPAN, the chief rice-producing countries, and
13 there are paddy-fields everywhere and large swamps
14 here and there. When passing through these places,
15 each soldier must use snow shoes (made of straw and
16 sticks).

17 " The present war is a war with JAPAN's
18 rise or fall at stake. What is at the bottom of
19 AMERICA's action of gradually prohibiting the export
20 of oil and iron to JAPAN, as if to strangle her slow-
21 ly by 'silk-wool'? If they stopped the export at
22 once, JAPAN, in her desperation, might march into
23 the south. If the export of the rubber and tin of
24 the south are checked by JAPAN, AMERICA's own suffer-
25 ings will be far greater than those of JAPAN, who is

1 harrassed for want of oil and ore. It has been the
2 policy of AMERICA up to now not to anger JAPAN,
3 though weakening her.

4 " JAPAN has waited too long--if JAPAN is
5 patient any longer our aircraft, warships and motor
6 cars will not move. Five years have passed since the
7 beginning of the CHINA Incident. Over 1,000,000 com-
8 rades have exposed their bones on the continent.
9 The arms of CHIANG KAI-SHEK, who killed these comrades,
10 were sold mostly by ENGLAND and AMERICA. Both ENGLAND
11 and AMERICA are prejudiced against the solidarity of
12 the Oriental races as something that stands in the
13 way of their making the Orient their permanent colo-
14 nies and are concentrating every effort on letting
15 JAPAN and CHINA fight. Our allies, GERMANY and ITALY,
16 are continuing a battle of death in EUROPE against
17 ENGLAND, AMERICA and SOVIET-RUSSIA. AMERICA is al-
18 ready assisting ENGLAND and is essentially particip-
19 ating in the war. For the existence of JAPAN herself
20 and her obligation to the three-country alliance, not
21 a minute longer must be endured. JAPAN is confronted
22 with a great mission, bravely to put the last finish-
23 ing blow as representatives of the Oriental race to
24 their invasion of several hundred years. Our incom-
25 parable Navy is in full readiness and is infallible:"

1 5, 5, 3 is the ratio in figures but if spirit is
2 added, it is 5, 5, 7. Moreover, half of the British
3 Navy has been smashed by GERMANY. For the Navy, now
4 is the best time. The Chungking Government's umbili-
5 cal cord is joined to ENGLAND and AMERICA. Unless this
6 cord is severed soon, the JAPAN-CHINA Incident will nev-
7 er be permanently settled. The total settlement of the
8 holy war is the present war. The spirits of over a hun-
9 dred thousand warriors are guarding us. The mass for
10 the dead comrades is to win this war.

11 "Whilst showing our heartfelt thanks to the
12 Navy, who, conquering thousands of miles of sea and re-
13 moving enemy interception, are protecting us without
14 sleep and rest, we must fully repay them for their trou-
15 ble with good war results. We are privileged with an
16 important and honourable mission to stand as represent-
17 atives of the Asiatic race and to reverse the history
18 of the world, succeeding our glorious history of 2,600
19 years and for the trust and reliance in us of His Maj-
20 esty the Emperor. Both rank and file with one mind
21 must exhibit the real value of JAPAN's sons at the full-
22 dress display watched by the whole world. The comple-
23 tion of the SHOWA Restoration to free ASIA in realiz-
24 ation of the Imperial Will, which is for peace in the
25 East rests on our shoulders."

E₁ I will read paragraph 10 below:

d
e₂ "10. 15 NOVEMBER 1941

r
&₃ "The pamphlet entitled 'Message to War-
4 riors in the South Seas', was issued on 15 November
A 1941 above the signature of Major General HORII,
b₅ Tomitaro, Commander of the South Seas Detachment
r which comprised the main force in the attack on
c₆ GUAM. A complete translation of the document is
m set forth below. The blank boxes in the text
7 occur in the original document. In some captured
8 copies of this pamphlet, the possessors have
9 written in the ideographs for AMERICA, GREAT
10 BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

11 "RESTRICTED

12 "A Guide for Warriors in
13 The South Seas

14
15
16
17 "Headquarters of the South Seas Detachment
18 15 November 1941.

19 HORII Force, Staff - Educational Pamphlet No. 1
20 Instructions regarding the attached: 'Message
21 for Warriors in the South Seas'
22
23
24
25

1 "To all units and militarized civilian per-
2 sonnel under my command:

3 "This pamphlet, together with the previously
4 distributed 'Collection of Imperial Rescripts,' to
5 which are annexed: 'Field Service Instructions' and
6 'Just Read This and the War is Won,' is to be used as
7 material for the practical strengthening of morale in
8 the field.

9 "15 November 1941. HORII, Tomitaro, Commanding
10 General, South Seas Detachment.

11 "Instructions given to the officers, men and
12 civilian employees under His Majesty the Emperor and
13 under my command, on the occasion of the formation of
14 the South Seas Detachment and their departure for
15 operations:

16 "In obedience to the orders of His Imperial
17 Majesty, I now take command of your honored unit as an
18 independent force, and am about to undertake a vital
19 duty. I cannot repress my deep emotion, and I feel
20 keenly the gravity of my responsibility.

21 "I am convinced that the world situation sur-
22 rounding EAST ASIA faces an unprecedented crisis, and
23 the fate of the Empire hangs in the balance. I be-
24 lieve that all of you, habitually bearing in mind the
25 Imperial Edicts, have obeyed the orders of your

1 superiors, and have striven with all your might;
2 however, at this time when your unit has been newly
3 organized and is about to take the field you are to
4 stress to yourselves these three great principles
5 with fullest courage:-

6 "The strict observance of military discipline;
7 the strengthening of esprit de corps; and the de-
8 termination to fight to the death for certain victory.
9 Whether you be under the higher commands or under the
10 command of subordinate officers, whether you be of-
11 ficers or militarized civilian personnel, true to the
12 spirit of loyalty, you are to have faith in and
13 assist the combined action of the land and sea forces
14 working together as one body; thus you shall do your
15 utmost to utilize the results of your training to
16 display the combined fighting strength of the detach-
17 ment.

18 "You will take care of yourselves, bear in mind
19 my wishes, and upon the opening of hostilities deter-
20 mine to exalt still more the true worth of the de-
21 tachment, swiftly bringing the Holy War to a suc-
22 cessful termination, and thereby carrying out the
23 Sacred Imperial Desire.

24 "These are my instructions.

25 "HORII, Tomitaro, Commanding General, South Seas

1 Detachment.

2 "Message to Warriors of the South Seas Detachment.
3 15 November 1941:

4 "The purpose of the forthcoming campaign is to
5 exalt to the world the virtues of His Imperial Majesty,
6 the Marshal Commander-in-Chief, and to complete the
7 establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
8 Sphere. Our great mission is to shatter at one stroke
9 the attempts of (blank, blank, blank, blank, blank) to
10 obstruct the disposal of the CHINA Affair, and the
11 spreading of the Imperial Way far and wide in these
12 territories. For us, the Imperial Forces, it would
13 be inexcusable if, through a chance miscalculation or
14 negligence, the Holy War ceased to be truly a holy
15 war, and the glory of the Imperial Throne were marred.

16
17 "Officers and men shall, needless to say, bear
18 in mind the mission of the Imperial Forces, and while
19 on active service shall regularly recite the Imperial
20 Rescript issued to the military. The present message
21 to soldiers in the South Seas is now given to the
22 officers, men and militarized civilian personnel of
23 our Detachment, upon whom rests a grave duty, as an
24 exhortation regarding military discipline."

25 I will read the bottom paragraph of the
first column, page 17:

1 "The South Seas Detachment, referred to in
2 Paragraph 10 above, was already organized under the
3 command of Major General HORII, Tomitaro, by 15
4 November 1941. This specially organized and sig-
5 nificantly named detachment constituted the force
6 which attacked GUAM on 10 December 1941 and later
7 moved on to RABAU and NEW GUINEA."

8 I will omit paragraph 11.

9 "12. 18 November 1941.

10 "Diary, belonging to Superior Private YAMASHITA
11 of 3 Battalion, 41 Infantry Regiment, contains the
12 following entry:

13 "18 November 1941 - About 1530 hours left
14 SHANGHAI, which has so many memories for me, and
15 boarded RYUJO MARU at 1730 hours.....with KIATING as
16 the objective, the brigade has been deployed for
17 maneuvers in order to exploit all the more its success
18 as a mechanized force. We are keenly feeling the
19 pressure of the situation and orders have eventually
20 come. The time has finally come for us to display
21 activity. Are we going to be at war with the three
22 powers A, B, and D? (Letters are written in English
23 in the original). With a feeling of serious tension,
24 I am aware that the most gratifying event since the
25 beginning of Japanese history is the fact that we have
now set out for the field."

1 "21 November - Anchored in sight of TAKAO".

2 I will turn to page 20, paragraph c:

3 "c. Battle Zone GUAM Island.

4 "Diary, presumably belonging to member of 44
5 Infantry Regiment, contains the following entries;

6 "17 November 1941 - Today we held review and
7 ceremony for leaving for the field participated in
8 by all personnel of the force.....

9 "21 November - Advance party left in the morning.
10 Unit commander in charge of military flags left about
11 1300.

12 "23 November - It rained during the morning and
13 we departed in the rain. We left from ASAKURA Station
14 at 1950. We arrived at SAKAIDE, about 0500.....

15 "24 November - Departed SAKAIDE. MATSUE MARU
16 left harbor at 1810.

17 "25 November - We left the INLAND Sea facing
18 east and headed southeast.....

19 "26 November - Our battle zone will be GUAM
20 Island In the morning I went on deck and saw
21 transports to the left, right and rear. On anti-air-
22 craft observation duty.

23 "28 November - Arrived at HAHAJIMA about 1650....

24 "1 December - Held maneuvers during morning.
25 Went on anti-aircraft observation duty. About 1500

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ship (Translator's Note: or 'ships') got under way.
Roused at 2200 for landing operations. Roused again
at 0100. About 0700 we returned to HAHAJIMA Habor.....
14 December - Gave BANZAI facing toward ASAMIYAZO
and left the Harbor of HAHAJIMA. At 0930 we proceeded
southeast to 'X'. We received an order announcing the
declaration of war. We expected to land at 'X' on the
10th....' "

1 MR. ENGLISH: I will turn to page 22, para-
2 graph 18.

3 "18. 29 NOVEMBER 1941

4 "a. Attack GUAM Island

5 "The SAKIGAWA Force (2 Company, 55 Transport
6 Regiment) embarked on the CHINA MARU from 22-24
7 November 1941, at SAKAIDE. On 29 November 1941,
8 aboard the CHINA MARU, First Lieutenant SAKIGAWA
9 issued the following operation order:

10 "'SAKI Operation Order No. 2.

11 SAKIGAWA Force Order

12 29 November, 1500 hours

13 CHINA MARU

14 "'1. The detachment will attack GUAM Island (The
15 name 'GUAM' has been inserted in ink. At the time
16 of mimeographing the order, the specific name of the
17 island was left blank.).

18 "'The enemy situation on GUAM is shown on the
19 special sketch (Sketch not attached to document).

20 "'The main strength (presumably of the South
21 Sea Detachment) will capture the coastal base of
22 Port APRA, while a part of the strength seizes
23 AGANA City.

24 "'2. The main strength (presumably of the
25

1 SAKIGAWA Force) of the force will land on the MADA
2 (presumably MATA) Coast Sector, while another part
3 of the force will land in the TOMITA Bay Area. They
4 will accompany the detachment's landing and serve as
5 supply and transport.

6 "'3. 1 Platoon will land at TOMITA Bay and
7 assist the TSUKAMOTO Detachment's landing.

8 "'4. Headquarters and 2 and 3 Platoons will
9 assist the KUSUNOSE Force's landing on the MADA
10 Coast.

11 "'5. Second Lieutenant ITO (plus one non-
12 commissioned officer and three enlisted men) will
13 land with the second wave and will reconnoiter a
14 landing area for the main strength of the company.

15 "'6. I will land with the third wave, accom-
16 panied by the main strength of the company, and will
17 prepare for our subsequent advance.

18 First Lieutenant SAKIGAWA

19 'SAKIGAWA Force'

20 "b. Meet Enemy at GUAM Island

21 "Diary, owner and unit unknown but presumably
22 a member of the South Seas Detachment, contains the
23 following entries:

24 "' 18 November 1941 - From 1000 hours infantry
25

1 group held war exercises under Major General HORII,
2 Tomitaro.

3 "124 November -- Left MARUGAME at 0630 hours.
4 Boarded MATSUE MARU at 1530 hours. Sailed at 1800
5 hours.

6 "128 November -- 1650 hours stopped over at
7 HAHAJIMA Island, OGASAWARA Archipelago.

8 "129 November -- Went ashore for communication.
9 AMERICA has disguised herself till now. We are
10 going to meet the enemy at GUAM Island with ever
11 increasing spirit.

12 "13 December -- Landed HAHAJIMA at 0230 hours
13 to wash clothes. It seems that the Japanese-
14 American talks will finally break down.

15 "14 December -- Worshipped the Imperial Palace
16 at 0830. Gave 3 BANZAIS! There was a speech. JAPAN-
17 AMERICA, War! It looks as though the hardships we
18 have borne until now will be rewarded! We have re-
19 ceived life for SHOWA's reign. Men have no greater
20 love than this. Convoy to sail! 0900! Now,
21 prosper, fatherland!

22 "14 December -- SOUTH HAHAJIMA Island at 1422
23 hours. The Empire had decided to go to war against
24 AMERICA, BRITAIN and HOLLAND. The Southern District
25

1 Army will quickly capture important regions in the
2 PHILIPPINES, BRITISH MALAYA and the DUTCH INDIES
3 after beginning attack on 8 December.

4 "' For this purpose the first Japanese-
5 American air attack will be carried out.

6 "' The South Seas Detachment will cooperate
7 with 4 Fleet to capture GUAM. If there is no
8 separate order, the landing will take place on 10
9 December.

10 "' HORII Operation Order A, No. 17. Each unit
11 will act according to Order A, No. 7 which has already
12 been issued."

13 "'8 December, 1100, war declared!"

14 "c. Land at TARO Bay

15 "Diary, owner and unit unknown, but presumably a
16 member of the South Seas Detachment, contains the
17 entries set forth below: The entry of 29 November
18 1941 anticipates a Japanese landing north of TALO-
19 FOFO Bay on GUAM. The MADA or MATA Coast referred to
20 as a landing site for the SAKIGAWA Force in Para-
21 graph 18a above is directly north of TALOFOFO Bay.

22 "'22 November 1941 -- 0327 hours. Reached
23 SAKAIDE. 1000 hours. Inspection tour of the
24 CHERIBON MARU."
25

1 "'23 November -- 1700 hours. Left SAKAIDE.

2 "'27 November -- Sighted BONIN Islands. 0800
3 hours, reached HAHAJIMA Island.

4 "'28 November -- 0900 hours. Went to YOKOHAMA
5 MARU for liaison.

6 "'29 November -- Training for boarding motor
7 barges during the morning. It has been decided that
8 battalion will land on the north side of TARO Bay
9 (TN: presumably TALOFOFO Bay on GUAM).

10 "'2 December -- Anchorage point penetration
11 training from 2000 hours.

12 "'3 December -- Battalion officers to meet on
13 YOKOHAMA MARU from 0900 hours. Training in smoke
14 flare and gas. Conference of company commanders,
15 decided to land at IRIYA Bay. Two first-class
16 cruisers came to the anchorage point to escort us and
17 we feel very safe.

18 "'4 December -- The convoy left at 0900 hours.

19 "'6 December -- Heard the Japanese news broad-
20 cast in the salon. Our mission is to attack UNITED
21 STATES."

22 I will turn to paragraph 19, page 24.

23 "19. 1 DECEMBER 1941 ...

24 a. Firing Plan

25 "Firing plan issued by 48 Field Antiaircraft

1 Battalion, on 1 December at KEELUNG Harbor in
2 FORMOSA specifies that the following precautions
3 will be taken:

4 "Battalion will cooperate with Keelung Army
5 Air Defense Force against air attacks. All units
6 will protect KEELUNG Anchorage by endeavoring to
7 destroy enemy planes as far as possible outside the
8 harbor.....'

9 "20. 2 DECEMBER 1941

10 "a. JAPAN Decides on War

11 "Diary, owner and unit unknown, contains the
12 following entries:

13 "'24 November 1941 -- Embarked on DAIFUKU
14 MARU (3,523 tons) of N.Y.K. Line at SAKAIDE.

15 "'26 November -- Destroyer UZUKI, is escorting
16 our convoy.

17 "'2 December -- Loaded horses at NAHAJIMA.

18 "'4 December -- Order of HORII, Tomitaro, South
19 Seas Detachment Commander:

20 "'On 2 December Imperial JAPAN decided on war
21 with GREAT BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and
22 HOLLAND. Imperial JAPAN will, on 8 December, carry
23 out its first air-attack against the UNITED STATES.
24 This detachment will, if there is no special order,
25 land on GUAM.

1 "b. Land on PHILIPPINE Islands

2 "Diary of NISHIMURA, Haruichi, member of 1
3 Special Naval Landing Party, YOSHIMOTO Unit, con-
4 tains the following entries:

5 "'7 November -- Conscripted.

6 "'30 November -- Boarded KIRISHIMA MARU at
7 UJINA. Escorted by Destroyers No. 36 and 37. Head-
8 ed for PALAU.

9
10 "'2 December -- Heard over radio that American
11 fleet (5 ships) had left harbor. Heard that we are
12 to land on the PHILIPPINE Islands after resting at
13 PALAU.

14 "'5 December -- Arrived PALAU.

15 "'6 December -- Enemy submarine sighted 5000
16 meters away.

17 "'7 December -- Relations between UNITED STATES
18 and JAPAN are getting worse.

19 "'8 December -- War was declared at 8:00 A.M.
20 KATSUDA MARU sunk.'

21 "21. 3 DECEMBER 1941

22 "a. Shoot Hostile Planes Down

23 "Extracted from 77 Flying Regiment Operation
24 Order A-12, dated 3 December 1941 at SAMA Airfield,
25 specifies the following precautionary measures:

1 "'2 Squadron will cooperate with 70 Airfield
2 Company and serve in the air defense of SAMA. Air-
3 planes taking hostile action will be shot down.....'

4 "22. 4 DECEMBER 1941

5 "Diary belonging to HAMANO, Yonekichi, of South
6 Seas Detachment contains the following entries:

7 "'4 October 1941 -- Called to serve in the Litter
8 Company of the Western No. 32 Force for temporary
9 duty at 1300. Later, waited at the Marugame Com-
10 mercial School until 15 November. Moved to the
11 Marugame Middle School.

12 "'22 November -- Embarked at SAKAIDE Harbor
13 at 1300. Weighed anchor at night.

14 "'23 November -- Looked as if we dropped anchor
15 and waited in OSAKA Bay. Weighed anchor at night.

16 "'27 November -- Entered CHICHIJIMA, Harbor of
17 the OGASAWARA Archipelago.

18 "'28 November -- Left port in the morning and
19 entered HAAJIMA the same day. Waited at this port.

20 "'4 December -- Left HAAJIMA with the object
21 of capturing the American Island of GUAM. This same
22 day our country decided to declare war on ENGLAND,
23 the UNITED STATES, and FRANCE on 8 December.

24 "'10 December -- At 0200, our South Seas
25

1 Detachment (waiting for this moment to bomb) re-
2 ceived orders to make a landing. Bombing started
3 on the 8th.'

4 "File of reports, entitled 'THAILAND Opera-
5 tions,' belonging to 77 Flying Regiment, contains
6 the following passage:

7 "'4-7 December 1941 -- Protection of 25 Army
8 transport convoy and preparation for occupation of
9 THAILAND.'

10 "Diary belonging to MORIKAMI, Shigco, of HORII
11 Force (presumably the South Sea Detachment), TAKA-
12 MORI Unit, contains the following entries:

13 "'3 December -- Sailing preparations.

14 "'4 December -- Will depart for GUAM Island,
15 however, GUAM is called OMIYA SHIMA.

16 "' 5 December -- Will depart at 1000 hours.
17 We are cruising safely.

18 "'6 December -- Cruising safely. We will dis-
19 embark in three days.

20 "'8 December 1941 -- Imperial Headquarters.
21 War was declared against ENGLAND and the UNITED
22 STATES at 1230 hours. In the afternoon, I heard
23 from Captain TAKAMORI that HAWAIIAN Islands are being
24 bombed by our air force. The PHILIPPINES and HONG
25

1 KONG are also being bombed. At 0800 hours of the
2 8th, our TAKAMORI Unit worshipped the Palace. We
3 will finally begin landing from 1200 hours of the 9th.
4 On the morning of the 8th, some islands could be
5 faintly seen for the first time."

6 I will omit the next diary entry.

7 "Diary belonging to TAKAHASKI, Yaichi of South
8 Sea Detachment, Antiaircraft Unit, TAKAHASHI Platoon
9 contains the following entries:

10 "'14 November 1941 -- We finally received
11 orders to go to the front. On 28 July we had
12 separated from the friendly 73 Force in KOREA and
13 we were reorganized as the 47 Antiaircraft Battalion.
14 On 14 November at 0900, we carried out the last
15 ceremony of farewell on the parade ground. When we
16 were leaving for the front, Commander FUCHIYAMA gave
17 instructions and read written oath addressed to the
18 Imperial Palace. I have no reluctance in giving my
19 life and being killed in action. We went up to the
20 GOKU Shrine to pray for our ultimate victory. We
21 received sacred SAKE from the god. Then we shouted
22 'BANZAI' three times and dismissed."

23 I will omit the next five paragraphs.

24 "'4 December -- At 0930 hours, we eventually
25 left the island. We immediately began to prepare for

1 combat. Approaching enemy position. We were on
2 board 18 days, and every day was the same routine.
3 On 11 December at 0100 hours, we came, at last, face
4 to face with enemy positions. We have a mission on
5 GUAM Island.

6 "Diary, belonging to an unspecified member of
7 41 Infantry Regiment, contains the following entries:

8 "15 September 1941 - Attached to 1 Company,
9 41 Infantry Regiment. Instruction by battalion
10 commander, Lieutenant Colonel MORITA.....

11 "20 November - Headed for WOOSUNG, aboard the
12 ABAYAMA MARU.

13 "21 November - Left WOOSUNG for South Seas.

14 "24 November - Reached northernmost tip of
15 HAINAN Island.

16 "4 December - Left SAMO. Convoy of 28 ships,
17 escorted by the Navy, headed for SINGAPORE."

18 I will omit seven paragraphs.

19 "Diary belonging to leading Private MATSUURA,
20 Sagami of 144 Infantry Regiment contains the follow-
21 ing entries:

22 "29 September 1941 - Received induction orders.
23
24
25

1 "'5 October -- Entered service.

2 "'8 October -- Completed mobilization.

3 "'22 November -- Embarked. Sailed in the
4 evening. Arrived off OSAKA in the morning. We did
5 not sail during the day. Set sail at night. Headed
6 due south. We sailed southward till the morning
7 of 27th. When I went up on deck in the morning, I
8 saw a little island. It was one of the BONIN Islands.

9 "'27 November -- Reached CHICHI Island.

10 Departed at 0900 hours the same day. Reached
11 HAHAJIMA Island before noon and anchored. There
12 are not many people living on this island. Ships
13 come here one after another. The bay is filled with
14 large ships. It seems as though there are about
15 seven or eight men-of-war here too. At first there
16 were names on the warships; UZUKI, YUZUKI, and
17 KIKUZUKI etc., but the names were taken off. This
18 transport ship had MI written on the smoke stack
19 but it also has been removed. Horses were unloaded
20 on HAHAJIMA Island. Horses and dogs romped around
21 the hills. Those who had previously been here say
22 that the women are not beautiful but they speak the
23 TOKYO dialect. We fished to pass the time till the
24 4th December. In the meantime horses were loaded.
25 I suppose we are again headed for hot places. We

1 had mosquito nets and lunch boxes made for us.

2 "4 December -- Today, we are really going
3 to set out for our destination. We sailed around
4 10 o'clock. We started in the morning with a warship
5 as escort. It was the KUROGAME. They were practical-
6 ly all carrying airplanes. As soon as we entered
7 this harbor, two airplanes were started as if they
8 had rehearsed going out on reconnaissance. There were
9 many escort ships. As long as the Navy is present,
10 there is nothing to be afraid of.

11 "6 December -- Tomorrow, we are told, GUAM
12 Island will be attacked and occupied. During the
13 voyage all necessary preparation of arms, such as
14 150 rounds of ammunition, were in readiness. With
15 these we can kill. It is heavy but I feel like taking
16 more.

17 "10 December -- At 0200, we will bid farewell
18 to this boat. We got on this boat on the 21st and
19 started to sail on the morning of the 10th. We lived
20 on it for 20 days. At night we made various prepara-
21 tions for tomorrow's landing. I packed food for 3
22 meals in my haversack along with 150 rounds of ammu-
23 nition. It is supposed to be packed as light as
24 possible but it is very heavy. We landed on one
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1 portion of the island which was barely visible in the
2 dark. We anticipated enemy fire but did not en-
3 counter any. We landed successfully without incident.'"
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1 I will now read the middle of the first
2 column on page 27:

3 "Diary belonging to IMOTO, Gumpei of
4 French Indo-China Expeditionary Force, 106 Land Duty
5 Company contains the following entries:

6 "'1 November 1941 -- Reached SAIGON at
7 0600 hours.

8 "'27 November -- Left SAIGON at about 1400
9 hours.

10 "'28 November -- Enroute.

11 "'29 November -- Enroute.

12 "'30 November -- Enroute TAIKAI MARU.

13 "'1 December -- Safely arrived in the
14 morning at HAINAN ISLAND.

15 "'2 December -- Still anchored at HAINAN.

16 "'3 December -- Remained aboard TAIKAI
17 MARU until 1600 hours and transhipped to KASHII MARU.
18 Stayed aboard that night.

19 "'4 December -- Departed at 0600 hours
20 for our destination.

21 "'7 December -- Reach SINGORA safely at
22 2400 hours.

23 "'8 December -- At 0300 hours, made pre-
24 parations for opposed landing. Around 0600 hours an
25 opposed landing was made. Took the enemy completely

1 by surprise."

2 I will turn to the middle of the first
3 column on page 28:

4 "48 Field Antiaircraft Battalion Operation
5 Order A-16, dated 4 December 1941 at KEELUNG Harbor
6 aboard the MONTREAL MARU, sets forth the following
7 instructions for antiaircraft defense during the
8 coming landing operations, presumably on LUZON:

9 "1. Battalion will fight according to plan
10 on separate sheet.

11 "2. All units will shoot down enemy
12 reconnaissance planes.

13 "3. Each Unit will immediately report
14 dead space and field of fire.

15 "Army Air Defense Unit Battle Plan.

16 "I. Plan:

17 "The Air Defense unit will at all times
18 be ready to fire at planes and submarines. It will
19 take the initiative and directly assist in the pro-
20 tection of ships, and will cooperate with the naval
21 and air forces. During torpedo attacks it will
22 endeavor to shoot planes down.

23 "II. Essential Points:

24 "(a) Establish strong aerial defense points.
25 Co-ordinate all efforts with the aim of destroying

1 enemy planes as far away as possible from ships.

2 Battle plan shown on separate sheet.

3 "(b) Establish strong points for anchorage
4 defense against air attack at the landing point,
5 and co-operate with front line operations and engage
6 in defending strategic points.

7 "(c) After initial landing, as quickly as
8 possible land the following:

9 48AA 3AA)
10 1AA) ½ each
 2AA)

11 and from the beach engage in protecting anchorage,
12 completing a battalion landing and defending military
13 strategical points. Details of position will depend
14 on time of landing. ;

15 "(d) If the situation demands it, for the
16 progress of a partial operation on front line, force
17 will be sent to any strategic point.

18 "(e) Aerial defense at assembly points
19 will be carried out by ship units.'

20 "5 December 1941.

21 "Diary belonging to KAWANO, Susumu, of
22 106 Land Duty Company contains the following entries:

23 "23 September -- Drilled. Inspection for
24 all mobilized personnel. From 0700 hours visitors
25 were allowed in camp area.

1 "'6 October -- 0700 hours arrived SAIGON.

2 "'23 November -- Left on transport TOKO-
3 KAWA MARU.

4 "'25 November -- Arrived SAMA, HAINAN Is-
5 land. Transferred to KASHII MARU.

6 "'5 December -- 30 Transports headed to-
7 wards the theater of operations with naval escort.

8 "'8 December -- Made opposed landing at
9 SINGORA, THAILAND.'

10 "Liary, owner and unit unknown, contains
11 the following entries:

12 "'24 November 1941 -- Arrived at HAIKOW,
13 HAINAN Island.

14 "'27 November -- Left HAIKOW.

15 "'30 November -- Arrived at HUMEN.

16 "'2 December -- Left HUMEN.

17 "'4 December -- Arrived SAMA Harbor.

18 "'5 December -- Sailed from the harbor at
19 0400 hours for operations.

20 "'8 December -- Arrived at SINGORA, MALAY
21 Peninsula at 0140 hours.'

22 "'6 December 1941.

23 "Liary, owner unknown, contains the following
24 entry:
25

 "'6 December 1941 -- Aboard LAIFUKU MARU.

1 The MIYAJI Platoon. No. 3 Platoon Orders for
2 landing attack on GUAM.

3 "1. Condition of enemy and terrain at the
4 landing site has already been pointed out. This
5 company is to be the first in line on the left of
6 the battalion.'

7 "7 December 1941.

8 "Day of Revenge.

9 "Diary belonging to MIYAKE, Yashitaka,
10 of Sasebo 5 Special Naval Landing Party contains
11 the following entries:

12 "'24 November 1941 -- Left for PALAU at
13 1000 hours.

14 "'25 November -- At 2000 hours we were
15 ordered to change our course and go directly to
16 SAMA, HAINAN Island.

17 "'4 December -- Arrived SAMA Harbor at
18 0800 hours, Departed on the 7th for CAMRANH Bay.
19 Captain spoke on the declaration of war with ENGLAND
20 the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS. The entire
21 crew rejoiced. At last the day of revenge has
22 arrived.

23 "'9 December -- Arrived CAMRANH Bay.'"
24

25 I will turn to page 30:

"Section II. Further Preparations for War."

1 I will read paragraph b:

2 "Japanese Land Operations (Campaign Study
3 No. 3), a publication issued by the Military Intel-
4 ligence Service, United States War Department and
5 based entirely on Japanese sources gives the follow-
6 ing account of JAPAN's preparations for war:

7 "The units and commanders designated for
8 the various tasks in the war for which they were
9 preparing were selected months in advance, and were
10 concentrated in special training areas where the
11 terrain and climatic conditions approximate those
12 in the regions where they were to fight. The Malayan
13 Army trained in HAINAN and INDO-CHINA, the Philippine
14 Force in FORIOSA and both units practiced landing
15 operations during the late summer and fall of 1941
16 along the SOUTH CHINA Coast. Even the divisions
17 chosen to attack HONG KONG were given rigorous train-
18 ing in night fighting and in storming pill boxes in
19 the hills near CANTON . . .

20 "Japanese commentators made no secret of
21 the fact that the High Command was fully informed
22 for a year before the war as to the strength, dis-
23 position and likely plans for defense of their then
24 potential enemies. . . .

25 "'Task forces' organized during the summer

1 of 1941 trained and worked together continuously
2 (i.e. Joint Army-Navy forces) until the outbreak of
3 hostilities. . . .

4 "The troops used in their operation (at
5 VIGAN on LUZON) as well as those used in the sub-
6 sequent landing at LINGAYEN, had been carrying out
7 landing operations all summer along the CHINA Coast,
8 from CANTON to the INDO-CHINA Border. Little if
9 any military advantage resulted from those oper-
10 ations, and it would now appear that they had been
11 intended solely for training. . . .

12 "Japanese accounts give only a hint of
13 their years of painstaking surveying and espionage
14 work throughout the KRA Isthmus and the MALAY Penin-
15 sula, but they are quite frank in describing pre-
16 parations made during the summer and fall of 1941.
17 These included negotiations with THAILAND for the
18 landing of troops on the KRA Isthmus, for the use
19 of the BANGKOK-SINGAPORE Railroad, and for arrange-
20 ments to cache supplies for the use of the Expedi-
21 tionary Force.

22 "The troops assigned to make the initial
23 landings were selected officers and men, drawn from
24 units which had long service in CHINA, and organized
25 into two divisions specially equipped for the work

1 they had to do. All of the troops which were to be
2 used in the campaign had been given exhaustive
3 training during the fall in selected areas of INDO-
4 CHINA, and HAINAN Island, where the terrain approx-
5 imated that over which they were to fight. When
6 these units landed in MALAYA, far from being unused
7 to the climate and the country, as the British ex-
8 pected them to be, they were trained and seasoned
9 jungle fighters, the equal of any troops with whom
10 they were to come into contact. The divisions which
11 made the landings had spent the month of September
12 in executing landing operations on the South CHINA
13 Coast, in conjunction with units which were practic-
14 ing for similar tasks in the PHILIPPINES.

15 "As the time appointed for the attack
16 grew near the troops were withdrawn from their train-
17 ing areas and assembled on HAINAN Island, where
18 large forces could be concentrated in complete
19 security far from the eyes of spying foreigners.
20 Here they were completely re-equipped with new guns,
21 vehicles and other equipment of the latest type. A
22 few weeks' training with the new material and the
23 expedition was ready for its big test. . .

24 "Two divisions which had seen very little
25 activity in the march down the peninsula, but which

1 were composed of veteran soldiers of the CHINA
2 campaign who had received special training in river
3 crossings in preparation for this very task of storm-
4 ing the Straits of JOHORE, were now brought up to
5 relieve those divisions which had fought their way
6 down the Peninsula.'

7 "Training for Assault on SINGAPORE.

8 "Colonel YOKOYAMA, Yosuke, Commanding
9 Officer, 15 Independent Engineer Regiment, in a
10 report on that regiment dated 25 May 1942, made the
11 statement quoted below. It is noteworthy that the
12 training which they received is of precisely the
13 type most essential to warfare in MALAYA and especi-
14 ally for the assault on SINGAPORE:

15 "'As shown in summary of the war service
16 record on a separate sheet, this unit was organized
17 from the 4 Engineer Regiment in September 1938.

18 "'From the end of last December the unit
19 took part in the capture of MALAYA and SINGAPORE
20 and the SUMATRA Operations.

21 "'Although originally the function of this
22 unit was that of an 'A' regiment, which is similar
23 to that of divisional engineer, this unit was trained
24 for about a year with special emphasis on attacking
25 pill-boxes and operations with flatbottom boats

1 with outboard motors attached (These boats are used
2 in river operation crossings). Thus all personnel
3 can handle these boats. As an "E" regiment they
4 have become capable of making crossings of large
5 rivers.

6 "They have received a citation and certi-
7 ficate of merit from the Army Commander for the
8 engagement at PINYANG and also two citations for the
9 MALAY Operation and for making a crossing in the
10 face of the enemy at SINGAPORE."

11 "D. Trained for PHILIPPINE Islands Battle.

12 "Navy Eagles over the PHILIPPINE Skies,"
13 a series of interviews by ALACHI, Kazuo, a reporter,
14 with naval air personnel engaged in the PHILIPPINES
15 Operations, quotes an unnamed Japanese pilot to the
16 following effect:

17 "I think that I will not be able to ever
18 forget the first excitement which I experienced
19 on 8 December. As I watched that formation of troops
20 advancing on MANILA and experienced that I could not
21 hold back the tears because of the joy I felt. We
22 had gone through intensive training over a long
23 period of time in preparation for this battle, and
24 now we have dealt a spectacular blow."

25 "Construction of Bases.

1 "PALAU.

2 "Translation of a captured document entitled
3 'Precautions in respect to Billeting and Supplies,
4 based on the Special Characteristics of PALAU',
5 dated 1 July 1942, issued by 35 Infantry Brigade
6 Headquarters, reads as follows:

7 "'Essential Points:

8 "'PALAU is the seat of the South Sea Island
9 Government. Ever since it became a mandated terri-
10 tory as a result of the First World War, our govern-
11 ment has anticipated what it would be today. It has
12 been a place difficult to administer, and the Navy
13 has steadily completed its equipment as an operational
14 base.

15 "'Major General KAWAGUCHI,

16 "'Brigade Commander.'"

17 I will turn to page 33.

18 THE PRESIDENT: This is a convenient break.
19 We will recess for fifteen minutes.

20 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
21 taken until 1100, after which the proceedings
22 were resumed as follows:)
23
24
25

Greenberg & Barton

1 MARSHALL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now
2 resumed:

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. English.

4 MR. ENGLISH: Page 33: (Reading)

5 "SECTION III.

6 "PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE AND RECONNAISSANCE

7 "30. GENERAL

8 "a. Simplified Table Showing Changes in
9 the Southern Situation Since August 1941

10 "Issued by 20 Division Headquarters, is set
11 forth as Figure 2. The table is not dated, but it
12 is evident from internal evidence that the data was
13 accumulated prior to the outbreak of war. Only those
14 positions of the table containing information which
15 appears to have been derived from confidential Japa-
16 nese sources are reproduced.

17
18 "Simplified Table Showing Changes in the
19 Southern Situation Since August 1941

20 "20 Division Headquarters
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"WEEKLY
REPORTS"

"Summary	"Date	"Source of Information	"Dispatched From
"The strength on the BURMA-THAI- LAND Border is approx. 50,000 and at BURMA there will be another 2000 to 3000 from the Volunteer Army.	"Mid- September	"Chief of Staff Report	
"The increase in strength in MALAYA will be presumed as 10,000 Australians. (Approximately 5,000 Australians at SINGA- PORE in Mid-August, and at the end of August, although there is no information on the number, transports carrying Australians had reached SINGAPORE). Heretofore, the regular army of 48,000 has	"End of October	"Chief of Staff Report	

1 reached approximately
2 60,000. Moreover, if
3 we make a rough esti-
4 mate of the increase
5 in Hindu troops, (in-
6 crease not according
7 to confirmed intelli-
8 gence) it will not
9 exceed the estimate
10 of 71,000-75,000 by
11 the SINGAPORE Foreign
12 Affairs at the end of
13 August.

14 "b. Sketch Showing Allied Air Forces in
15 South West Pacific Area

16 "A sketch, issued by the Army Air Defense
17 Unit and labelled 'Air Defense Intelligence Report
18 No. 1', showing dispositions and strengths of Allied
19 Air Forces in South Sea Islands is reproduced as
20 Figure 3. The sketch is dated 6 December 1941 but
21 an annotation states that it was prepared 'before
22 the crisis.'
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1 I will read paragraphs 32 to 36, but only
2 the headings and occasionally a paragraph or two:

3 "32. JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF
4 UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
5 PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

6 "a. UNITED STATES Strength--PHILIPPINE
7 ISLANDS

8 "A file of handwritten sheets, dated July--
9 December 1941, entitled 'No. 3 Situation of Both
10 Sides Prior to the Outbreak of War,' issuing author-
11 ity not specified, reads in part as follows:

12 "The strength of the American Garrison
13 Army in the PHILIPPINES was 12,000 (American about
14 5,500; native about 6,500). Because of the inter-
15 national situation, however, this number was increased
16 by about 5,200 Americans and 6,000 natives, so that
17 by July of this year, the total reached 22,000.
18 The Filipino National Guard and patrol scouts were
19 included under General MACARTHUR, the American Far
20 Eastern Army Commander who was to undertake the uni-
21 ted command of all troops in the PHILIPPINES."

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I will go to paragraph 33:

"33. PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITY IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

"a. Sketches Showing NETHERLANDS EAST
INDIES Defense Forces 1935-1940 (41)

"Three captured sketches, undated, issuing
authority not specified, showing disposition and
strength of NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES forces on the
islands of JAVA, SUMATRA and BALI are reproduced as
Figures 5, 6 and 7. Although the sketches are not
individually dated, one of them bears the note
'1935 to the present.' The present would seem from
internal evidence to refer to 1940 or 1941."

1 The Tribunal may wish to examine the maps
2 on pages 36, 37 and 38.

3 I will go to page 39, paragraph 34:

4 "34. PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN NEW GUINEA

5 "The following intelligence report on BRITISH
6 NEW GUINEA is based on the observations of Major
7 TOYOFUKU, Tetsuo, in March 1941. The experience
8 gained by this officer was subsequently utilized
9 through his appointment to the staff of the South
10 Seas Detachment, the force which later fought over
11 this same country. The preface and text of the
12 report read as follows:

13 "Military Data on BRITISH NEW GUINEA

14 "General Staff Headquarters

15 "Reproduced by: General Headquarters,
16 Southern Army

17 "Headquarters, Eastern Detachment,

18 "1 October 1942

19 "This data was compiled from the report of
20 an inspection by Major TOYOFUKU, Tetsuo, March 1941,
21 and from data obtained and arranged thereafter.

22 "References perused for data are: 'Military
23 Report on British owned NEW GUINEA', published by
24 the Naval General Staff September 1940; Volume II
25 of 'NEW GUINEA Sailing Directory' published by

Hydrographic Department; Charts Nos.: 854, 857, 859, 878, and other necessary maps.

"Part I - Military Value of BRITISH NEW GUINEA and SOLOMON Islands:

"These possessions, together with the DUTCH EAST INDIES Archipelago, form a natural barrier intersecting the PACIFIC OCEAN from north to south. The northern end is within the radius of action of our bombers from most of the South Sea Mandated Islands, and the southern end is within the radius of action of bombers from the northern part of AUSTRALIA. (It is approximately 1000 kilometers from TRUK and PONAPE Islands, in our South Sea Mandate, to RABUL, capital of the Australian Mandated Territory; approximately 1250 kilometers from COOKTOWN, NORTH AUSTRALIA, to RABUL, and approximately 600 kilometers to PORT MORESBY.) They are separated from the Australian Continent by the narrow TORRES STRAIT. Consequently, possession of this territory would make it easy to obtain the command of air and sea in the South West PACIFIC and to acquire 'stepping stone' bases for operations against AUSTRALIA. Control of the southern coast of NEW GUINEA, in particular control of TORRES STRAIT, would cut communications between the South PACIFIC

1 OCEAN and DUTCH EAST INDIES as well as the INDIAN
2 OCEAN Area; and would force the enemy fleet to
3 deſour to the Southern coast of AUSTRALIA.

4 "As mentioned above, it is considered
5 that this is strategically important territory for
6 Japanese Operations in the South Seas, especially
7 against AUSTRALIA. Moreover, Japanese forces should
8 consider it very fortunate that the places used as
9 bases for air and sea forces in this territory are
10 not few."

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I will turn to page 42, paragraph 35:

"35. Pre-War Espionage in Australia

"a. Sketch Showing Disposition of Australian Troops.

"An annotated sketch showing the disposition of Australian military forces as of July 1940 is reproduced as Figure 8. The sketch appears to have been issued by OSAMU (16 Army) Group Headquarters."

The Tribunal may wish to examine the sketch on page 43.

Page 44:

"Table issued by OSAMU (16 Army) Group Headquarters, dated July 1940, and setting forth the organization of the Australian Army, reads as follows:"

The Tribunal may wish to examine the table on page 44, page 45, page 46 and page 47.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. English.

MR. ENGLISH: I will turn to page 47, paragraph 36:

"SECURITY MEASURES IN KOREA

"Prior to 8 December 1941 precautions against the leakage of information were detailed and thorough. An official document dated September 1941 shows that 19 Division in KOREA took most

1 elaborate precautions to prevent any news of military
2 value from being obtained by nationals of other
3 countries.

4 "Extracts from Counter-Espionage Regula-
5 tions drafted 30 September 1941, held by 47 Field
6 Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion based 19 Division
7 Staff Report.

8 "Measures to be taken while awaiting
9 orders.

10 "No. 1 Policy.

11 "Periodical and progressive reform in-
12 struction will be given concerning counter-
13 espionage and various regulations. Do not permit
14 natives of enemy territory to participate in our
15 schemes for obtaining intelligence of any kind.
16 At the same time the arousing of a positive con-
17 sciousness in officers and men (employees included)
18 so they can act in themselves to nullify and com-
19 pletely crush the various plans and strategies
20 of the enemy. Thus, by hoodwinking the enemy
21 and hiding our own plans we will have nothing to
22 fear in putting our military preparations into
23 operation.

24 "Paragraph 21. - Restrict the contact
25 of military personnel with foreigners especially

1 those outside barracks, to that of official business.
2 (Particularly in regard to language study and religion).

3 "Precautions will particularly be taken
4 with Englishmen, Americans, Russians and anti-
5 'Hitlerites', of whom there are a large number,
6 even though they are Germans, to avoid malicious
7 behaviour or prevent discovery of our intentions.

8 "Control the association of Korean
9 Christians with Englishmen and Americans.

10 "Paragraph 22. - Watch the conversation
11 of the families of soldiers, especially children,
12 and restrict their acquisition of matters that
13 concern the army.

14 "Acting in concert with the provincial
15 authorities particularly the school authorities,
16 keep control over wild rumours and false reports
17 from students (T.N. school children) and make an
18 attempt to guide them in such matters.

19 "Each household will report domicile,
20 etc. of all Koreans employed by the commander of
21 the unit to which it is associated.

22 "Be strict in supervision and investigation
23 of merchants, especially Koreans entering and
24 leaving the compound of the official residence.

25 "Paragraph 38.-Enforce directions con-

cerning prevention of espionage when having dealings with gendarmes and with government and private schools of each province in KOREA. Also with post offices, journalists, etc.

"Paragraph 54 -Develop in soldiers the faculty of preventing espionage and let them develop their own resourcefulness. It is expected that they will be on special guard when in contact with Koreans, etc. (For example, Koreans examining the contents of soldiers' wastepaper baskets.)"

"SECTION IV. PUBLICATIONS OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

"37. GENERAL

"A survey of captured documents indicates that a considerable number of training manuals, instructions, etc., bearing directly on subsequent military operations were published during the year and a half preceding the outbreak of war. Normal military programs may well account for the greater part of these publications. In many instances, however, their subject matter serves to document the trend of Japanese military interest, while in a few cases official statements prefaced to publications are clearly indicative of the approaching

1 crisis. A list of pertinent publications chrono-
 2 logically arrayed according to date of issue, is
 3 set forth in the following paragraph.

4 "38. LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

5 "Military Geography of NETHERLANDS EAST
 6 INDIES

7 "List of military secret documents received,
 8 belonging to 41 Infantry Regiment, dated 9 July
 9 1942, contains the following items:

10 "Date of Preparation	Subject
11 "'30 April 1940	BRITISH MALAYA:
12	Military Geography and
13	General Description.
14 "'1 November 1940	DUTCH EAST INDIES: Military
15	Geography.
16 "'1 November 1940	DUTCH EAST INDIES: Military
17	Geography. (Separate volume)
18 "'30 August 1941	BRITISH BORNEO: Military
19	Geography and General
20	Description.
21 "'15 October 1941	The Resources
22	BRITISH MALAYA."
23	
24	
25	

1 I will read only the paragraphs which I
2 indicate:

3 "d. Rapid Training of Air Service
4 Personnel.

5 "Index list of military secret documents
6 taken over by Confidential Books Officer of 41
7 Infantry Regiment on 10 October 1942. Prepared by
8 War Ministry:

9 "Date or Preparation

Subject

10 April 10, 1941

On the rapid training
11 of men for air service.

12 "e. Future Treasure of JAPAN.

13 "Colored map entitled 'Great East ASIA and
14 PACIFIC,' issued by Cabinet Printing Department on
15 30 April 1941. Pencilled near NEW GUINEA is the com-
16 ment -- 'Future treasure of JAPAN, Population
17 300,000.'"

18 I will turn to page 50, paragraph (1):

19 "1. Map of Military Installations -
20 SINGAPORE.

21 "Colored map entitled, 'East Asia Co-Fros-
22 perity Sphere, Large Map of Western PACIFIC OCEAN,'
23 published in September 1941, issuing authority not
24 specified. Insets include: Map of world, sketch map
25 of military installations of SINGAPORE, detailed map

1 I will read only the paragraphs which I
2 indicate:

3 "d. Rapid Training of Air Service
4 Personnel.

5 "Index list of military secret documents
6 taken over by Confidential Books Officer of 41
7 Infantry Regiment on 10 October 1942. Prepared by
8 War Ministry:

9 "Date or Preparation

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11 of men for air service.

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22 perity Sphere, Large Map of Western PACIFIC OCEAN,'
23 published in September 1941, issuing authority not
24 specified. Insets include: Map of world, sketch map
25 of military installations of SINGAPORE, detailed map

1 of JAVA, and detailed map of the HAWAIIAN Islands.

2 "k. Manual of Landing Operations.

3 "Reference Manual on Landing Operations,
4 compiled by Inspector General of Military Education,
5 dated 18 September 1941. Introduction contains the
6 following passage:

7 "This book was distributed without delay
8 in order to furnish materials for reference on land-
9 ing operations."

10 "n. Identification of Allied Planes.

11 "Printed Handbook entitled 'Identification
12 of Soviet, American and British planes, 'published
13 in September 1941 by Inspectorate General of Mili-
14 tary Education.'

15 "p. Japanese-Malayan Vocabulary.

16 "Printed pamphlet containing Japanese-Malayan
17 vocabulary dated October 1941 issued by Naval General
18 Staff.

19 "q. Tropical Hygiene Handbook.

20 "Printed Manual entitled 'Tropical Hygiene
21 Handbook' edited by Medical Bureau, Navy Department,
22 published by Bureau of Education, Navy Department,
23 dated October 10, 1941."

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1 I direct the Tribunal's attention to
2 Appendix A, which is a chart of the matter contained
3 in the pages preceding it. The chart begins on page
4 52 and ends on page 65.
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1 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, --

2 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

3 MR. LOGAN: (Continuing) in the first page
4 of this document it appears that this report was
5 solely based on documentary evidence held at ATIS,
6 GHQ prior to 1 January 1945. The defense would like
7 to know if these documents are still held by ATIS or
8 by the Prosecution staff; and, if so, we would like
9 to have the opportunity of examining them both be-
10 cause of translation matters and to examine portions
11 which were omitted in the report.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. English.

13 MR. ENGLISH: Your Honor, the Prosecution
14 Section has not in its possession any of these docu-
15 ments, nor has the Allied Translator and Interpreter
16 Section of GHQ the documents here in Tokyo.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Do you suggest that the
18 defense might be allowed to peruse the material from
19 which this report has been made up if that opportunity
20 presents itself? It does seem to be in the inter-
21 ests of a fair trial that they should have that
22 opportunity.

23 MR. ENGLISH: Yes, your Honor.

24 THE PRESIDENT: I feel that all my col-
25 leagues agree with that.

1 MR. ENGLISH: In fact, your Honor, the
2 Prosecution Section made serious efforts to obtain
3 these documents but was unable to get them.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Was any reason given to
5 you?

6 MR. ENGLISH: I have a communication here,
7 your Honor.

8 THE PRESIDENT: I will deal with the matter
9 in Chambers on an application by the defense.

10 MR. ENGLISH: That would be the proper
11 place, your Honor.

12 THE PRESIDENT: What was that?

13 MR. ENGLISH: I submit that that might be
14 the proper place to deal with this matter, in
15 Chambers.

16 THE PRESIDENT: It is unless you have some
17 material there that indicates that an application
18 would be useless.
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1 MR. ENGLISH: I have a communication from
2 ATIS addressed to the Chief of the Investigation
3 Division of IPS, which reads as follows:

4 "Regarding your request for the original
5 documents used as a base for compilation of ATIS
6 Report No. 131 entitled, 'Japan's Decision to Fight,'
7 I hereby inform you that they were shipped from
8 Brisbane, Australia, and Manila, Philippine Islands,
9 to the Washington Document Center, Washington, D.C.
10 during the period May, 1945, to October, 1945."

11 THE PRESIDENT: They are in Washington,
12 that is the answer.

13 MR. ENGLISH: That is the answer, your Honor.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Do you see any reason why
15 I should not make an order -- why the Tribunal should
16 not make one -- for their production here?

17 MR. ENGLISH: A member of the prosecution
18 staff went to Washington to try to get the documents
19 but was unable to do so. However, there is no reason
20 why such an order should not be made, your Honor.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Photostat copies will do.

22 The prosecution not objecting, we make an
23 order for the production of the originals or photo-
24 stat copies.

25 MR. ENGLISH: Will the Clerk mark for

of page 2:

"We owe the officers and men of the Army and Navy debts of heartfelt gratitude and unbounded admiration for the demonstration of their great prowess. For years they have been silently going through hard training in preparation for this day. Once war starts, they go to the front, with no thought of returning alive, for the cause of the State."

I offer in evidence prosecution's document No. 2521, which is a chart prepared by the First Demobilization Bureau of the Japanese Government showing the total strength of the Japanese Army from January 1, 1930, to January 1, 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 2521 will receive exhibit No. 880.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 880 and was received in evidence.)

MR. ENGLISH: I will read the chart:

"The Total Strength of the Japanese Army.

<u>"Period</u>	<u>Division</u>	<u>Brigade</u>	<u>Total Strength</u>
1 Jan. 1930	17	4	250,000
" " 1931	17	4	250,000"

1 identification prosecution's document No. 1555,
2 entitled "Tokyo Gazette," Volume V, No. 8, February,
3 1942?

4 Reference is made to court exhibit No. 448,
5 page 5102 of the record being three certificates
6 showing the source of the "Tokyo Gazette" as having
7 come from the Japanese Institution of Foreign Affairs
8 and certifying that these magazines were issued under
9 governmental supervision.

10 I offer in evidence prosecution's document
11 No. 1555-I, an excerpt from prosecution's document
12 No. 1555, in the form of a Ministerial Address of
13 the accused TOJO to the 78th Session of the Imperial
14 Diet, December 16, 1941.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

16 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
17 No. 1555 will receive exhibit No. 879 for identifica-
18 tion only. Prosecution's document No. 1555-I will
19 receive exhibit No. 879-A.

20 (Whereupon, prosecution's document
21 No. 1555 was marked prosecution's exhibit
22 No. 879 for identification; and prosecution's
23 document No. 1555-I was marked prosecution's
24 exhibit No. 879-A and was received in evidence.)
25

MR. ENGLISH: I will read the last paragraph

of page 2:

"We owe the officers and men of the Army and Navy debts of heartfelt gratitude and unbounded admiration for the demonstration of their great prowess. For years they have been silently going through hard training in preparation for this day. Once war starts, they go to the front, with no thought of returning alive, for the cause of the State."

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1 Jan. 1930	17	4	250,000
" " 1931	17	4	250,000"

1 THE PRESIDENT: Read where the big changes
2 take place.

3 MR. ENGLISH: (Continuing)

4	"1 Jan. 1938	26	5	950,000
5	" " 1939	35	15	1,130,000
6	" " 1940	43	16	1,240,000
7	" " 1941	53	24	1,350,000

8 * * *

9	" " 1943	68	25	2,400,000
10	" " 1944	80	41	2,900,000"--

11 THE PRESIDENT: 1942 is worth reading.

12 MR. ENGLISH: (Continuing)

13 "The number of division shows the total of
14 infantry divisions, tank divisions, flying division
15 groups, flying divisions and flying training divisions."--

16 THE PRESIDENT: For 1942 the figures are:
17 "56, 25, 2,100,000."

18 MR. ENGLISH: 2,100,000 men; 56 -- 25
19 brigades -- 2,100,000 men. (Continuing):

20 "The number of brigades shows the total of
21 independent mixed brigades, independent infantry
22 brigades, cavalry brigades, artillery brigades, inde-
23 pendent tank corps, task brigades on sea and the
24 Karafuto Mixed Brigade.

25 "'Total Strength' shows the permanent

1 establishment, so the number is roughly estimated.

2 "The necessary materials to the estimation
3 of the above numbers were lost on account of burning
4 up and so on at the termination of the war. So, this
5 is the best record that the 1st Demobilization
6 Bureau can offer at present (July 16, 1946) through
7 various remaining records (and a part of them was
8 collected from memories)."

9 This concludes this phase of the case.

10 Brigadier Quilliam will now introduce evidence of
11 the illegal fortification of Japan's mandated islands.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Quilliam.

13 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: Mr. President and
14 Members of the Tribunal, it is now proposed to present
15 evidence which it is submitted will show that from the
16 year 1932 onwards Japan, in violation of treaties
17 and with a view to future wars of aggression, fortified
18 and established military and naval bases in the islands
19 in the Pacific held by her under mandate from the
20 League of Nations.

21
22 The counts of the Indictment to which this
23 evidence relates are all those in Group One, namely,
24 counts 1 to 36, inclusive, and the sections of the
25 Appendices affected are Section 5 (c) of Appendix A
and Clauses 15, 18 and 31 of Appendix B.

1 In order to show the situation of the
2 Japanese mandated islands I offer in evidence IPS
3 document No. 1756-H, being an excerpt from "The
4 Japan Year Book 1941-42." This book has been already
5 produced in evidence and is court exhibit No. 276.

6 THE PRESIDENT: This excerpt is admitted on
7 the usual terms.

8 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
9 No. 1756-H will receive exhibit No. 881.

10 (Whereupon, the document above
11 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
12 No. 881 and was received in evidence.)

13 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now read the
14 excerpt which is taken from page 909 of the book:

15 "South Sea Islands under Japan's Mandate.
16 Geographical Features.

17 "The South Sea Islands mandated to Japan,
18 numbering over 1,400, with an aggregate area of
19 2,148.80 square kilometers, are the Mariana, Marshall
20 and Caroline groups, between 131°10' and 172°10' of
21 east longitude and between 1°15' and 20°32' of north
22 latitude. The Hawaiian Islands are to the east; the
23 Philippines and Celebes to the west; the Bonin
24 Islands to the north, and New Guinea to the south.
25 Only one island among them, i.e. Guam, belongs to the

United States.

1 "The Mariana archipelago starts close to
2 the southern end of the Bonin Islands, stretching
3 toward the equator, and the Marshall and Caroline
4 groups extend to the east and west along the equator,
5 forming an inverted letter 'T' with the Marianas.
6 About 740 miles south of the Bonin Islands lies
7 Saipan, the largest of the Marianas, and about 180
8 miles farther south is Truk, one of the largest of
9 the Carolines, which marking the crossing point of
10 the inverted 'T', is the center of the mandated
11 territory. The line of 148° east longitude divides
12 the Carolines into the West Carolines, with Palau
13 and Yap, and the East Carolines, with Truk and Ponape.
14 Because of the distances between the islands and the
15 extensive area covered by them, communications are
16 difficult. The fact that each group of isles uses
17 different words peculiar to itself sufficiently dem-
18 onstrates the degree to which they are separated."

19 Mr. President, I have here copies of a map
20 prepared and issued by the American Army Map Service.
21 The map shows the mandated islands of Japan and their
22 situation with respect to other countries. I have
23 been able to obtain a copy for each Member of the
24 Tribunal and also four copies for the defense. It
25

has not been reproduced or translated in accordance
1 with the Tribunal's rules, and I am therefore unable
2 to offer it in evidence. I respectfully suggest,
3 however, that it would be helpful to the Members of
4 the Tribunal to be able to refer to the map and that
5 no prejudice would be caused the defense. I under-
6 stand that the defense has no objection to this
7 course. If the Members of the Tribunal wish to have
8 the maps for reference they can be handed to the
9 Clerk now.

10 THE PRESIDENT: There being no objection
11 by the defense, tender the map. You tender it,
12 Brigadier, and it is admitted on the usual terms.

13 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I tender the map in
14 evidence, if it please the Tribunal, now.

15 CLERK OF THE COURT: These maps, without
16 prosecution's identifying number, will be given
17 exhibit No. 882.

18 (Whereupon, the map above referred
19 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 882
20 and received in evidence.)

21 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

23 MR. LEVIN: On behalf of the defense may I
24 state that we have heretofore advised Brigadier
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1 Quilliam that there would be no objection with
2 reference to pursuing this course.
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1 THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Quilliam.

2 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May it please the
3 Tribunal, in order to explain the history of Japan's
4 Mandate, it is necessary to refer to Article 22 of
5 the Covenant of the League of Nations, to the terms
6 of the Mandate, and to the Treaty in respect of the
7 Mandate made between the United States and Japan.
8 The Covenant of the League of Nations has been
9 already produced in evidence as Court exhibit No.
10 23. Article 22 of the Covenant is as follows:

11 "To those colonies and territories which
12 as a consequence of the late war have ceased to
13 be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly
14 governed them and which are inhabited by peoples
15 not yet able to stand by themselves under the
16 strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should
17 be applied the principle that the well-being and
18 development of such peoples form a sacred trust of
19 civilization and that securities for the performance
20 of this trust should be embodied in this covenant.

21 "The best method of giving practical effect
22 to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples
23 should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason
24 of their resources, their experience or their geo-
25 graphical position can best undertake this responsibility,

1 and who are willing to accept it, and that this
2 tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories
3 on behalf of the League.

4 "The character of the mandate must differ
5 according to the stage of the development of the
6 people, the geographical situation of the territory,
7 its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

8 "Certain communities formerly belonging to
9 the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development
10 where their existence as independent nations can be
11 provisionally recognised subject to the rendering
12 of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory
13 until such time as they are able to stand alone.
14 The wishes of these communities must be a principal
15 consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

16 "Other peoples, especially those of Central
17 Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must
18 be responsible for the administration of the territory
19 under conditions which will guarantee freedom of
20 conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance
21 of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses
22 such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the
23 liquor traffic, and the prevention of the estab-
24 lishment of fortifications or military and naval bases
25 and of military training of the natives for other than

1 police purposes and the defence of territory, and
2 will also secure equal opportunities for the trade
3 and commerce of other Members of the League.

4 "There are territories, such as South-West
5 Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands,
6 which, owing to the sparseness of their population,
7 or their small size, or their remoteness from the
8 centres of civilization, or their geographical
9 contiguity to the territory of the mandatory, and
10 other circumstances, can be best administered under
11 the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of
12 its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned
13 in the interests of the indigenous population.

14 "In every case of mandate, the Mandatory
15 shall render to the Council an annual report in
16 reference to the territory committed to its charge.

17 "The degree of authority, control, or adminis-
18 tration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if
19 not previously agreed upon by the members of the
20 League, be explicitly defined in each case by the
21 Council.

22 "A permanent Commission shall be constituted
23 to receive and examine the annual reports of the
24 Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters
25 relating to the observance of the mandates."

1 In accordance with the provisions of Article
2 22 of the Covenant Japan was, on the 17th December
3 1920, granted a mandate to administer the groups
4 of Islands mentioned. The provisions of the Mandate
5 are set out in full in the Treaty made on the 11th
6 February 1922 between the United States and Japan
7 which has been produced in evidence as Court exhibit
8 No. 29. It is not proposed unless the Tribunal directs
9 otherwise to prove the Mandate as a separate document.

10 It is, I apprehend, unnecessary to refer
11 to all the provisions of the Mandate and I will read
12 only Article 4, which is as follows:

13 "The Military training of the natives,
14 otherwise than for purposes of internal police and
15 the local defence of the territory, shall be prohibited.
16 Furthermore no military or naval bases shall be
17 established or fortifications erected in the territory."

18 I will now read short extracts from the
19 Treaty made on the 11th February 1922 between the
20 United States and Japan (Court exhibit No. 29) under
21 which the United States consented to the administration
22 of the Islands by Japan.

23 "Article 1. - Subject to the provisions
24 of the present Convention, the United States consents
25 to the administration by Japan, pursuant to the

1 aforesaid Mandate, of all the former German Islands
2 in the Pacific Ocean, lying north of the Equator.

3 "Article II(first paragraph) - The United
4 States and its nationals shall receive all the benefits
5 of the engagements of Japan, defined in Articles
6 3,4 and 5 of the aforesaid Mandate, notwithstanding
7 the fact that the United States is not a Member of
8 the League of Nations."

9 I wish now to refer to the assurance given
10 by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of
11 State on the execution of the Treaty which has just
12 been mentioned, with respect to the extension of the
13 usual comity to nationals and vessels of the United
14 States in visiting the Islands. The assurance is
15 printed as an addendum to the Treaty on page 5
16 of Court exhibit No. 29 and (excluding formal parts)
17 is as follows:
18

19 "Japanese Embassy,
20

21 "Washington,
22

23 "February 11, 1922.
24

25 "In proceeding this day to the signature
of the Convention between Japan and the United
States with respect to the islands, under Japan's
Mandate, situated in the Pacific Ocean and lying
north of the Equator, I have the honour to assure

1 you, under authorization of my Government, that the
2 usual comity will be extended to nationals and vessels
3 of the United States in visiting the harbors and
4 waters of those islands."

5 It is now proposed to produce twenty-five
6 documents being the original depositions of 25 residents
7 of the Mandated Islands. As each original deposition
8 is produced it is proposed to read an excerpt or
9 excerpts from the deposition. By an Order made by
10 the Tribunal on the 5th July (Paper No. 275) compliance
11 with Rule 6(b)(1) of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure
12 was dispensed with on certain terms. It should be
13 mentioned that we have gone further than the require-
14 ments of the Tribunal's Order and have served the
15 defendants with full English copies of the depositions.
16 The prosecution, however, rely only on those parts
17 of the depositions which will be read to the Tribunal
18 and which are marked on the originals and English
19 copies. The full depositions have not been translated
20 into Japanese, only the excerpts. It is submitted that
21 these excerpts will prove that for several years
22 prior to December 1941 Japan made fortifications and
23 military and naval bases in her Mandated Islands.

24 The first eleven depositions are made by
25 residents of islands in the Marianas Group.

1 I offer in evidence IPS Document No. 6022,
2 being the deposition of Manuel Blanco.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

4 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, these
5 documents to which Brigadier Quilliam just referred
6 are apparently made by various natives of various
7 islands. We have no desire to make any unreasonable
8 requests on either the Tribunal or the prosecution,
9 but if the prosecution is depending on these affidavits
10 to establish that these mandated islands were fortified
11 and that the fortifications began on certain dates,
12 which they intend to establish through these affidavits,
13 we believe that if they are solely depending on this
14 testimony, without any other evidence whatsoever, that
15 we should be given the opportunity to cross-examine
16 these witnesses.

17 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now until
18 half past one.

19 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

MR. SOMIYA: I am SOMIYA, Shinji, counsel for the defendant OKA, Takazumi.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. SOMIYA.

MR. SOMIYA: I wish to speak on the document recently presented by the prosecution concerning the affidavit of an inhabitant of the South Seas. The inhabitants of the South Seas are of a very low cultural level, and there are those among them who can neither count nor even know their own ages. On looking over the affidavits I find that some of them -- that many of them -- that in many of them there is a confusion between the years preceding the war and those after the war began.

THE MONITOR: The facts preceding the war and after.

MR. SOMIYA: (Continuing) Therefore, I earnestly hope that we will be permitted to cross-examine these witnesses before this Tribunal. Mr. Logan has already asked for the appearance of the affiant as witness in this case, and I, myself, want on my part to

1 add my appeal to that of Mr. Logan. It is true that one
2 of the affiants is a Japanese. I have heard that this
3 Japanese has recently been repatriated. I say that
4 by the way. Thank you.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Quilliam.

6 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May it please the
7 Tribunal, in the first instance, I feel that I can
8 properly give an assurance to the Tribunal and to my
9 learned friend, Mr. Logan, that in addition to the
10 depositions, material, cogent evidence will be produced.

11 As regards the competency of these deponents,
12 may I suggest the Tribunal should later on make any
13 order that might be considered necessary in the circum-
14 stances.

15 MR. LOGAN: In view of counsel's statement,
16 may it please the Tribunal, we would like to suggest
17 these affidavits be received at this time conditionally
18 subject to the other proof the Brigadier mentioned.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Well, Mr. Logan's application
20 is based on the absence of other evidence besides the
21 affidavits. We must hear the other evidence that you
22 say you have, Brigadier, before we come to a decision.

23 We admit the document on the usual terms.

24 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
25 No. 6022 will receive exhibit No. 883.

1 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned docu-
2 ment was marked prosecution's exhibit No.
3 883 and received in evidence.)

4 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now read an
5 excerpt from the deposition. It is dated 16 March 1946.

6 (Reading): "I, Manuel Blanco, was born on
7 Saipan on 13 November 1906. I worked for the N.K.K.
8 as a blacksmith from 1934 to 1944. During this
9 period the Japanese Navy's most important military
10 construction projects were the buildings of ASLITO
11 Naval Air Base commenced in 1932 and it was never
12 completed. At the beginning of 1940 anti-aircraft,
13 coastal batteries, and other type of ordnance were
14 installed at the ASLITO Air field. I saw at that time
15 the NKK train bring plane parts and guns, bombs, etc.,
16 from the pier to the Aslito Naval Air Base. I helped
17 to build a bomb shelter at Aslito Field in 1938. The
18 hangars as well as other installations were camouflaged
19 with grass, trees, and plants beginning in the later
20 part of 1938."

21 I offer in evidence I.P.S. Document No. 6024,
22 being the deposition of Wakamatsu Makoto.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

24 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
25 No. 6024 will receive exhibit No. 884.

1 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned docu-
2 ment was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 884
3 and received in evidence.)

4 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will read an excerpt
5 from the deposition. It is dated March 16, 1946.

6 (Reading): "I, Nakamatsu Nakoto, was born at
7 Oita Ken, Kyushu, Japan, on 13 June 1907. I first
8 came to Saipan in 1935 to work as a Chemical engineer
9 for the N. K. K. I observed various military installa-
10 tions in the vicinity of the Aslito field on which
11 construction was commenced in 1933. Two years before
12 the outbreak of the war, the Japanese military built
13 a series of concrete trenches and shelters around the
14 Aslito Air Field, which were designated to serve as
15 means of protection in case of air raids. In 1940, I
16 happened to see some Japanese Navy Men storing a huge
17 amount of ammunition in some warehouses in Aslito Air
18 Field. These warehouses were situated in a forested
19 section and were camouflaged to look like trees. They
20 were coastal guns located on AGINGAN Point and NAFUTAN
21 Point. I heard after from NKK officials that there
22 was an anti-submarine net in Tanapag Harbor placed
23 there just before December 1941."
24

25

1 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I now offer in evidence
2 I.P.S. Document No. 6019, being the deposition of
3 Ignacio Benavente.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
6 No. 6019 will receive exhibit No. 885.

7 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned docu-
8 ment was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 885
9 and received in evidence.)

10 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will read an excerpt
11 from this deposition.

12 (Reading): "Date: March 16, 1946.

13 "I, Ignacio Benavente, Farmer and Village
14 Chief Assistant,

15 "As far as I can remember the ASLITO Airfield
16 was built in 1935. I saw a wireless station and
17 gasoline tanks at the same airfield before I left
18 for Yap in 1937 and another military wireless station
19 north of Susupo, site of present Signal Supply. I
20 heard at that time that an ammunition dump was being
21 built and also a large tank in 1935 near the harbor."

22 I offer in evidence I.P.S. document No. 6020
23 being the deposition of Elias P. Sablan.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

25 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document

No. 6020 will receive exhibit No. 886.

(Whereupon, the above-mentioned document was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 886 and received in evidence.)

BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will read an excerpt from this deposition.

(Reading): "Date March 16, 1946.

"I, Elias Sablan, was born on the 8 of November 1899, on Saipan, M. I. I worked as foreman loading and unloading cargoes. This work was carried on at Tanapag harbor in 1931. Aslito Field in 1935 was started. In 1939 Banadero construction began. The Japanese brought in about 10-inch guns stored them in warehouses. This occurred around 1937. They were set up in 1939 and 1940. The forced labor started in 1939 and they took Saipan Chamorros up to a reef to fortify it. Keeping forced labor there for 6 months. These people were paid two yens a day. Early 1931 --"

I think, your Honor, that is plainly "1941", although that is how it appears in the original.

(Reading continued): "Early 1931 the Japs started bringing in cement, lumber, many airplanes. In the summer of 1941, they started to bring in fighters, bombers, and many drums of gas. Forced labor used to help to fortify Saipan was used by the Japanese.

1 "About 18 November 1941 ten young Chamorros
2 21-25 who could speak English were picked forcibly and
3 another group one which later were told they were to
4 help the Emperor and Japan. On 6 December they were
5 sent to Guam on unknown mission. Second group was
6 sent to Guam on 8 December 1941. They were used to
7 search the island for gun positions to help the
8 Japanese but after being turned loose to watch they
9 hid in the jungles."

10 I offer in evidence I.P.S. document No. 6023,
11 being the deposition of Mariano Pangelinan.

12 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

13 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
14 No. 6023 will receive exhibit No. 887.

15 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned document
16 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 887 and
17 received in evidence.)

18 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now read an
19 excerpt from the deposition.

20 (Reading): "Date: 16 March 1946.

21 "I, Mariano Pangelinan, was born on November
22 1880 in Guam and came to Saipan in 1901. From 1903
23 to 1945 I served as district chief of District #2.
24 Under the Japanese I was a labor foreman."

25 "The Japanese were very careful to hide from

1 the native population all military installations and
2 fortifications, but I saw many signs of Japanese rearma-
3 ment in Saipan before 1941. This rearmament started
4 gradually around 1935 with the building of the Aslito
5 air field on the present site of Isley Field and made
6 rapid headway by 1940. I noticed during this period
7 the construction of ammunition dumps, military bar-
8 racks, and other military installations."

9 I offer in evidence I.P.S. document No. 6025,
10 being the deposition of Antonio Angailen.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

12 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
13 No. 6025 will receive exhibit No. 888.

14 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned docu-
15 ment was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 888
16 and received in evidence.)

17 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now read an
18 excerpt from the deposition.

19 (Reading): "Date: 16 March 1946.

20 "I was born on Saipan 24 November 1889. I
21 was elected District Chief of Carolinans in 1912 while
22 under the rule of the Germans. At present I hold the
23 same job. The Japanese ordered me to retain the same
24 position. In 1935 a Naval Air Base at Tanapag was
25 started. In 1937 Aslito (Isley) air field was built.

1 In 1940 Japanese emplacements were put up."

2 I offer in evidence I.P.S. document No. 6026,
3 being the deposition of Juan M. Ada.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
6 No. 6026 will receive exhibit No. 889.

7 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned docu-
8 ment was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 889
9 and received in evidence.)

10 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now read an
11 excerpt from the deposition.

12 (Reading): "Date: 16 March 1946.

13 "I was born in Guam on October 24, 1886, and
14 came to Saipan in 1890. In 1937 I was elected Head
15 Chief of Garapan Village. In administering the
16 village I was forced to take orders from the Japanese.
17 In 1935 the Japanese bought up the farms in the area
18 of Tanapag Village and immediately started building a
19 Naval Air Base."

20 I offer in evidence I.P.S. document No. 6021,
21 being the deposition of Concepcion Blanco.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

23 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
24 No. 6021 will receive exhibit No. 890.

25 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned document

1 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 890
2 and received in evidence.)

3 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now read an excerpt
4 from the deposition.

5 (Reading): "16 March 1946.

6 "I, Concepcion Blanco, age 27, was born on
7 Saipan on 13 December 1918. I worked as a clerk and
8 telephone operator in the Japanese Naval Construction
9 department at Tanapag Harbor, Saipan from 1938 to 1944.
10 In this capacity I had the opportunity to observe the
11 construction of Japanese military fortifications and
12 installations before December 1941. Six underground
13 tanks were constructed in 1937. I saw fuel installa-
14 tions at the seaplane base. There were five barracks
15 housing about 3000 military and naval personnel. The
16 construction of these began in 1938. There were two
17 radio stations constructed in 1938. There were five
18 signal stations operated by Kasuga butai at Garapan,
19 Shibata butai at Garapan, Nafuten, Agranhan, Tanapag,
20 Magacienne Bay. A Navy Rear Admiral was in charge of
21 all these signal stations."
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1 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM (Continuing): I offer in
2 evidence I.P.S. document No. 6017, being the deposition
3 of Vincente de Leon Guerrero.

4 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

5 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
6 No. 6017 will receive exhibit No. 891.

7 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned document
8 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 891 and
9 received in evidence.)

10 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will read an excerpt.

11 (Reading): "Date: 15 March 1946.

12 "I was born on the 9th October 1898 in
13 Garapan, Saipan. Since the age of 7 I entered the
14 Public German School up to the age of 16, when I was
15 graduated in April 1913. On December 1913, I was
16 sended to Yap to the German Dutch Cable and Co. to work
17 at the station as a operator.

18 "I was turned back to Saipan in February
19 1915. Since then I work at my father's farm in
20 helping my father supporting us, up to the time when
21 I got married at the age of 25. My job is still a
22 farmer, when in 1937 I was choosed as a foreman by
23 order of the Chamorran Administration, to go with a
24 party of 30 natives to work at the underground tanks
25 installations at Tanapag Harbor for 3 months. There

1 were 6 underground tanks (4 big ones and 2 small).
2 Each tank of the big size are approximately 1800
3 Feets round. We are informed by the authority that
4 we Chamorros to have to carry some jobs; because a
5 war might happen in the very near future, and these
6 installations must be done before too late, those
7 tanks when completed are to be filled with oil and
8 gasoline, for the ships that have to come in Saipan.
9 We are informed to keep the words very secret. Any-
10 body who tells such things must be punished by the
11 authority. The deepness of each of such tanks are
12 50 feet. The concrete around each tank are 3 feet
13 thick and iron plates are riveted in concrete. Iron
14 plates and concrete were used for roofing. In the in-
15 side of such tanks there were iron posts constructed
16 to hold the roof. Many pipelines were constructed in
17 connection of all the tanks. A big pipeline were
18 crossing from the tanks to the pier. Plants and trees
19 were used as camouflage. The location of such tanks
20 are between what is now Hot Plant No. 3 and Pipe
21 Plant. At the beginning of the year 1939, the Chamor-
22 ran Administration are informed from the authority
23 to conscript labor to send to Kainan to (Marcus Is.)
24 for another installation for a plane base. The
25 laborers have to be sendd over there for a three

1 month period. Another bunch of laborers were sended
2 at the beginning of 1940. The wages are ¥1.50 per day
3 and is under the Japanese Naval Operations.

4 "There were installed gun implacements in 1939
5 here in Saipan (AAA Battery behind the Japanese Naval
6 Headquarters in Garapan, several costel defenses gun
7 in Lanhan, Neftan Point, Agingen Point and Mirchot
8 Point). On the Island in front of Tarapag Harbor
9 were also installed a gun implacement (Maniagaso).
10 In every gun implacement were Navy personnel attached:
11 (Units of the Butai)."
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1 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM (Continuing): May it
2 please the Tribunal, may I direct the Tribunal's
3 attention to the fact that that deposition was written
4 out as the original shows, and as the English copy
5 by the deponent himself.

6 I offer in evidence I.P.S. document No. 6027,
7 being the deposition of Francisco de Borje.

8 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

9 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
10 No. 6027 will receive exhibit No. 892.

11 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned document
12 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 892 and
13 received in evidence.)

14 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will read an excerpt.
15 (Reading): "Date: 16 March 1946.

16 "I was born on April 3rd 1887 on Guam, I
17 came to Saipan in 1899 went to Angau in the Peleiu
18 Island group and returned to Saipan in Feb. 1946. I
19 worked as foreman for 800 workers in the Phosphorus
20 Company there, first for the Germans then the Japanese.
21 I knew of the building of an airfield on Peleiu in
22 1939."

23 I offer in evidence I.P.S. document No. 6018,
24 being the deposition of Jose S. Pangelinan.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
2 No. 6018 will receive exhibit No. 893.

3 (Whereupon, the above-mentioned document
4 was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 893 and
5 received in evidence.)

6 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will read an excerpt.
7 (Reading): "Date: 15 March 1946.

8 "I was born on Saipan, 27 March 1904; I was
9 10 years old in 1914 on October when the Japanese took
10 this Island (Saipan) from the Germans, I entered the
11 Japanese School, and at the same time, they gave me
12 a job as Messenger in the Japanese Milt. Govt. Head
13 office: In 1916 they change my job and put me as an
14 Interpreter in Japanese & Chamorro: In 1919 I quit work
15 and went to Japan (to school) study music and business
16 course, until 1923 when the big earthquake destroyed
17 Tokyo, I returned and work with my Father at the
18 farm (after I returned from Japan never had a chance
19 to get a job: In 1926 I went to Guam trying to get
20 permission from the Governor of Guam to reside on the
21 Island, but I failed; I married a Guam girl and re-
22 turned to Saipan the same year (I was in Guam for 3
23 months) and running my 50 acre sugar plantation using
24 Okinawans tenants, about 11 farmers, until 1934 when
25 the Japanese Government took my plantation away from me

1 and gave it to the N.K.K. (South Sea Development Co.)
2 the reason they said is 'NO NATIVE AUTHORIZED TO USE
3 A JAPANESE AS TENANTS' I know what they mean, and I
4 gave up. In 1923 --"

5 That must be an error, sir. It must be 1933.
6 1935.

7 (Reading continued): "In 1935 I went to
8 Ponape, started my own business (using native laborers)
9 as a copra trader, and sea transportation also. In
10 1940 they took my motor boat and sampan to use for
11 transporting materials from mainland to the small
12 islands around Ponape for installation; I returned
13 again to Saipan early in 1940 and on May the same year
14 I found my job at the seaplane base, using a bull cart,
15 as a material transporter from the Navy Ware Houses to
16 the contractors that working at the Seaplane Base. I
17 worked till September the same year, and during this
18 time, I noticed that there was 2 hangars, ware houses
19 containing a big quantity of food, lumbers, nails,
20 wires of all kinds and construction materials, small
21 airplanes, big air planes, etc: 1 Big overground heavy
22 builded concrete shelter containing all kinds of
23 explosives, bullets, bombs --- etc.: 2 or 3 repair
24 shop for servicing airplanes; about 8 or 10 Big Barracks
25 that can hold about 350 to 500 men each. During this

1 time (my working time) I became very acquainted with
2 many of the Navy Boys and they told me openly that
3 all of this work is for the military purposes.

4 "I did not working direct to the Navy, but
5 for the contractors, and my working hours is from
6 0600 to 1700 with one 30 minutes during the morning
7 and another 30 minutes in the evening, 1½ hour at noon
8 recess time. They feed me 3 times a day and paid me
9 ₡ 5.00 (five yens) per day.

10 "I noticed too that there was always 15 up
11 to 25 Big 4 propellers Seaplane and some fighting and
12 scouting plane. When they stopped me working at the
13 Seaplane Base, I helped my father who was a chief of
14 Section #2 in Garapan, issued laborers for the Air
15 Strip at Aslito and also for the load and unloading of
16 Ships at Tanapag, Chalan Kanoa & Tenian."

17 May it please the Tribunal, may I point out
18 that that deposition also was written out by the
19 deponent.
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1 I will now read an excerpt from this depo-
2 sition.

3 "Taken at: Moon Island, Truk and Central
4 Carolines.

5 "Date: February 25, 1946.

6 "Q. State your name, permanent home address,
7 and occupation.

8 "A. Alfred Nilo, assistant chief, Moon Island.

9 "Q. How long have you lived on the island of
10 Moon?

11 "A. Forty-five years.

12 "Q. How long have you been living in the Truk
13 Atoll?

14 "A. Forty-five years.

15 "Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications or
16 military installations constructed by the Japanese on
17 Moon Island prior to December 1941?

18 "A. Yes.

19 "Q. State what you know of your own knowledge
20 about the installations?

21 "A. During the latter part of 1938 the Japanese
22 started constructing a lighthouse on the eastern tip
23 of Moon. Prior to the constructing of the lighthouse
24 a dock was built along the eastern tip and then a road
25 from the dock to where the lighthouse was to be erected.

1 It required approximately one year to complete the
2 dock, road and lighthouse. Upon completion of the
3 aforementioned project the Japanese commenced build-
4 ing caves, gun emplacements, and a searchlight plat-
5 form. Six gun emplacements were built. The guns
6 appeared to me to have an eight or nine inch bore.
7 These installations were all in the immediate vicini-
8 ty of the lighthouse. During November of 1939 on the
9 mountain of Uitibium the Japanese dug a concrete em-
10 placement similar to a hut in which they installed
11 radar and erected two gun emplacements for the in-
12 stallation of five or six inch guns and two smaller
13 ones for anti-aircraft. In the same section two
14 platforms were constructed and searchlights placed
15 thereon. Two caves were dug into the mountain and
16 ammunition stored therein. Upon the completion of
17 this project in 1940 further development thereabouts
18 was unknown to us because it was then made a prohibited
19 area. On the eastern end of the island a radio sta-
20 tion was installed during 1939. This building was
21 constructed of concrete. In 1940 on the northwest
22 tip of the island the Japanese commenced building an
23 airstrip. This strip was completed after December
24 1941. On the southwestern tip of the island at the
25 same time another airstrip was under construction and

1 completed after December 1941. In 1940 on the north-
2 western tip of the island on the side of the mountain
3 close to the airfield two gun emplacements were con-
4 structed and guns installed there. They appeared to
5 me to have eight or nine inch bores, also a platform
6 and searchlight was installed there.

7 "Q. Were any revetments built along the airstrip
8 prior to December 1941?

9 "A. On the airfield on the southwestern tip one
10 was built before December 1941.

11 "Q. When were all the pill boxes along the shore
12 of Moon Island constructed?

13 "A. After December 1941.

14 "Q. I notice on the mountain of Utibium many
15 big guns, machine guns, range finder, cave housed flat
16 trajectory guns, and anti-aircraft guns, other than
17 the ones already mentioned by you; when were these
18 constructed?

19 "A. After December 1941, I believe for we were
20 not allowed to go there after the initial construction
21 in 1939 and 1940.

22 "Q. I notice on the southern tip, slightly in
23 rear of the airfield, anti-aircraft guns, cave housed
24 guns, and machine guns; when were these placed there?

25 "A. After December 1941.

1 "Q. I notice throughout the island quite a few
2 barracks to house the army and navy; when were they
3 constructed?

4 "A. After December 1941.

5 "Q. How many Japanese troops were here before
6 December 1941?

7 "A. A great number of Japanese personnel were
8 here on the island, and they had some barracks here at
9 that time also, most were built after December 1941.

10 "Q. Do you know of any installations built on
11 any islands in the immediate vicinity of Moon?

12 "A. Yes."
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THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document No. 6013 will receive exhibit No. 894.

(Whereupon, the document above mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 894 and received in evidence.)

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Brannon.

MR. BRANNON: Document No. 6013 contains the name on the first page of the alleged affiant as M-i-l-o, whereas, at the signature page, 4, the name is spelled M-a-i-l-o. I point out this discrepancy because of the nature of this evidence, and I also wish to call to the Court's attention that in this document, which is called an affidavit -- I withdrew that last statement. I omitted a paragraph in the reading here. I offer no objection to this, but wish to call it to the Tribunal's attention as an obvious discrepancy.

THE PRESIDENT: Probably M-i-l-o is phonetic.

BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: Mr. President, looking at the original, which is a typed document, apparently the deponent knew better how to spell his name than the person who did the typing. Although in the first instance it is spelled as M-i-l-o, it is also typed after the actual signature and there it is plain

1 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.
2 CLERK OF THE COURT; Prosecution's document
3 No. 6013 will receive exhibit No. 894.

4 (Whereupon, the document above
5 mentioned was marked prosecution's
6 exhibit No. 894 and received in evidence.)

7 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Brannon.

8 MR. BRANNON: Document No. 6013 contains
9 the name on the first page of the alleged affiant
10 as M-i-l-o. I point out this discrepancy because of
11 the nature of this evidence, and I also wish to call
12 to the Court's attention that in this document, which
13 is called an affidavit -- I withdraw that last
14 statement. I omitted a paragraph in the reading here.
15 I offer no objection to this, but wish to call it to
16 the Tribunal's attention as an obvious discrepancy.

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18 phonetic.

19 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: Mr. President, looking
20 at the original, which is a typed document, apparent-
21 ly the deponent knew better how to spell his name
22 than the person who did the typing. Although in the
23 first instance it is spelled as M-i-l-o, it is also
24 typed after the actual signature and there it is plain
25

1 from the original that "a" has been inserted be-
2 tween "M" and "i," a correction made necessary by
3 their seeing how he wrote his own name.
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1 "Q. State what you know of your own knowledge
2 about those installations.

3 "A. On the island of Mor during 1940 a con-
4 crete reinforced dock was built. Two gun emplace-
5 ments were constructed and guns installed thereon,
6 appearing to be about three inches in diameter. Also
7 buildings were built for the men and one searchlight
8 was installed there. Telephone communication was in-
9 stalled between that island and Mo n. The island has
10 flat terrain and in one section a lookout tower was
11 built.

12 "Q. Were there any other installations built
13 on this island?

14 "A. No.

15 "Q. On what other islands you know of install-
16 ations being placed?

17 "A. On the island of Pisemeu during 1940.
18 The exact construction was made there as took place
19 on Mor."

20 I offer in evidence I.P.S. Document No. 6001,
21 being the deposition of Joseb Uerbelau.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

23 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
24 ment No. 6001 will receive exhibit No. 895.

25 (Whereupon, the document above men-

1 tioned was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 895
2 and received in evidence).

3 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM:

4 I will now read an excerpt:

5 "Dated: 26 February 1946

6 "1. Q. What is your name?

7 A. JOSEB UTRBELAU

8 "2. Q. What is your date of birth?

9 A. 1908, I do not know the day.

10 "3. Q. Where were you born?

11 A. NGERBECHED, KOROR ISLAND, PALAU...

12 "4. Q. What is your present home address?

13 A. NGEREMID, KOROR ISLAND, PALAU.

14 "5. Q. What is your occupation?

15 A. I am the native Chief of Police for mil-
16 itary government on KOROR ISLAND.

17 "9. Q. Do you know of construction of forti-
18 fications or military installations prior to Dec-
19 ember, 1941?

20 A. Yes.

21 "10. Q. Do you know the type of installation,
22 the place of construction, and the date concerned?

23 A. I know of a gun emplacement constructed
24 at NGERENLENGUI, BABELTHUAP, in 1939.

25 "11. Q. Did you witness this construction?

.....

1 A. Yes.

2 "12.Q. Did you work on it?

3 A. No.

4 "13.Q. Did you see the gun in the finished
5 emplacement?

6 A. No, the area was restricted by the Jap-
7 anese after its completion.

8 "14.Q. Was forced native labor used on the gun
9 emplacement on BABELTHUAP?

10 A. Yes.

11 "15.Q. How do you know this was a gun emplace-
12 ment?

13 A. I saw the gun being brought from a
14 boat at NGEREMLENGUI Harbor to the area of the gun
15 emplacement.

16 "16.Q. Do you have knowledge of construction
17 work before 1941 other than that mentioned?

18 A. No.

.....

20 "50.Q. Do you have knowledge of other incidents
21 of forced native labor and if so relate same?

22 A. The gun emplacement at NGREMDIU, URU-
23 ITHAPEL was constructed with forced native labor.

24 "51.Q. When did this take place?

25 A. In February, 1941.

1 "52.Q. Previously you said the construction
2 of the gun emplacement on BABFLTHUAP was the only
3 fortification or military installation that you your-
4 self knew was built before December, 1941. Is the
5 date February 1941, correct?

6 A. Yes, it is correct. When I answered
7 before I did not know what you meant.

8 "53.Q. Did you work there?

9 A. Yes."
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1 "54. Q Who ordered you to work there?

2 A The PALAUAN Government, a branch
3 of an subordinate organization of the South
4 Seas Government.

5 "55. Q What are the inclusive dates of this
6 period of labor?

7 A February 1941 to July 1941.

8 "65. Q Did you see them place the gun in
9 the emplacement you worked on?

10 A Yes, I saw them and helped the Navy
11 Gonzokus put the gun in place. The gun moved
12 around and up and down while I sat on it.

13 I offer in evidence I.P.S. document No.
14 6002, being the deposition of AUKST RIUMD.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

16 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
17 No. 6002 will receive exhibit No. 895.

18 (Whereupon, the document above
19 mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit
20 No. 895 and received in evidence.)

21 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will read an excerpt:

22 "1. Q What is your name?

23 A Aukst Riumd.

24 "2. Q What is your date of birth?

25 A March 24, 1913.

1 "3. Q Where were you born?

2 A At MELEKEIOK village on BABELTHUAP
3 Island.

4 "4. Q What is your present home address?

5 A NGEREMID Village, KOROR Island, Palau.

6 "5. Q What is your present occupation?

7 A I am a native policeman for Military
8 Government on KOROR Island.

9 "9. Q Do you know of the construction of
10 fortifications or military installations by the
11 JAPANESE prior to December, 1941?

12 A Yes.

13 "10. Q Do you know the type of installation,
14 the place of construction, and the date concerned?

15 A I know of a gun emplacement constructed
16 at CIGUL Village, BABELTHUAP, in 1939.

17 "11. Q Did you work on it?

18 A No, I did not work on the emplacement.
19 I was a supervisor of native labor called in to do
20 the manual labor. The natives were ordered to do
21 the work.

22 "12. Q Who ordered this work?

23 A A vice-admiral of the JAPANESE Navy,
24 not Admiral ITO.

25 "13. Q Was this a written order?

1 A Yes, the written order was brought to
2 the village chief by a navy man and the chief in
3 turn ordered the natives to work.

4 "14. Q Did this order state there would be
5 punishment for those who did not comply with it?

6 A Yes, the order said the gun emplace-
7 ment was to be finished by a certain date and we
8 want so many natives. Those failing to report
9 will be punished.

10 "15. Q Did you see this order?

11 A Yes, the village chief showed the
12 order to me.

13 "16. Q Do you have the order?

14 A No, the Navy man took it away with
15 him after the chief and I had seen it.

16 "17. Q Can you describe the vice-admiral
17 who issued this order?

18 A I cannot describe him. I know that
19 he left these islands in 1939.

20 "18. Q Did you supervise the entire construction
21 of this gun emplacement?

22 A No, I supervised the natives who
23 carried boxes to the gun emplacement.

24 "19. Q Did forced native labor build the gun
25 emplacement?

1 A No, the Navy Gonzokus built it.

2 "20. Q Did you see the contents of any
3 of the boxes the natives carried to the gun
4 emplacement?
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1 "A. No, I did not see the contents. The
2 natives carried the supplies to the site of the gun
3 emplacement which had not been built at that time.

4 "21. Q. Did you see the completed gun em-
5 placement?

6 "A. Yes, but the gun was not in it yet.

7 "22. Q. Do you remember what date this was?

8 "A. No, only that it was 1939.

9 "23. Q. Did you see the gun placed in this
10 fortification?

11 "A. No, I did not see a gun placed there
12 but later in March 1944, I saw a gun there.

13

14 "36. Q. Besides the above mentioned gun em-
15 placement, do you know of other fortifications
16 constructed prior to December 1941?

17 "A. Yes, I worked on the PELELIU Air-
18 field from January 1936 to March 1936.

19 "37. Q. Were you forced to do this work?

20 "A. Yes, I was ordered by the South Seas
21 Government Officer, KAJISHIMA, to take the place of
22 a man who became sick.

23 "38. Q. Was this a written order?

24 "A. Yes.

25 "39. Q. Do you still have this order?

1 "A. No, I returned it when I reported
2 for work.

3 "40. Q. What did the order say?

4 "A. It read, 'On (date) you, RIUMD, report
5 and bring this order to the South Seas Government
6 Officer, KAJISHIMA. If you fail to do so, you will
7 be punished.

8 "41. Q. Can you describe this man KAJISHIMA?

9 "A. He was a civilian who worked for the
10 South Seas Government.

11 "42. Q. What type of work did you do during
12 this period?

13 "A. I carried stones and dug holes to
14 place the dynamite in.

15

16 "48. Q. Were there any airplanes in the area
17 at that time?

18 "A. No, the airfield wasn't finished.

19 "49. Q. Were there any gun or fortifications
20 around this area?

21 "A. No.

22 "51. Q. Besides the above mentioned informa-
23 tion, do you know of any other fortifications or mili-
24 tary installations constructed prior to December,
25 1941?

1 "A. I have heard of others but these
2 were the only ones I worked on."

3 I offer in evidence I.P.S. Document No. 6012,
4 being the deposition of ICHIRO MOSES.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

6 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
7 No. 6012 will receive exhibit No. 897.

8 (Whereupon, the document above mentioned
9 was marked Prosecution's Exhibit No. 897 and
10 received in evidence.)

11 I will now read an excerpt from the deposition:

12 "Taken at: Moen Island, Truk and Central
13 Carolines.

14 "Date: February 23, 1946.

15 "Q. State your name, permanent home address,
16 and occupation.

17 "A. Ichiro Moses, assistant chief, Uman Island.

18 "Q. How long have you lived on the island of
19 Uman?

20 "A. Forty-five years.

21 "Q. How long have you been living in the Truk
22 Atoll?

23 "A. Forty-five years.

24 "Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications
25 or military installations constructed by the Japan-

ese on Uman Island prior to December 1941?

"A. Yes.

"Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about the installations.

"A. In 1939 on the southern section of Uman Island the Japanese commenced building roads and fortifications. Houses were built to billet troops, a searchlight was installed, emplacements for big guns built, and two big guns and four small ones, installed. They dug a cave, reinforced it with concrete, and stored ammunition therein. This construction was under the direction of the navy. The officer in charge of the troops billeted there was Taicho. Second in command was Buntaisi. During 1940, prior to December of that year, on the island of Otto, eight miles south of Uman, the Japanese Navy erected a wharf, houses, installed a searchlight, two guns with bores of about two or three inches in diameter, and several machine guns were installed. During 1941, prior to December of that year, on the island of Salat, eight miles east of Uman, the Japanese Navy constructed a wharf, houses, installed a searchlight, two guns with bores appearing to be about three inches in diameter, and erected a radio station.

.....

1 "Q. Were all the guns in the southern part
2 of Uman installed in 1939, 1940, and prior to December
3 1941?

4 "A. Yes.

5 "Q. In the construction of the buildings
6 what material did they use?

7 "A. For the buildings they used concrete
8 foundation and the rest was lumber. The cave was
9 concrete reinforced and all emplacements were con-
10 crete based.

11 "Q. How many caves did they build before
12 the war?

13 "A. Only one.

14 "Q. Did you see ammunition stored in the
15 cave before the war?

16 "A. Yes.

17 "Q. Did they have a great quantity of am-
18 munition there?

19 "A. Yes.

20 "Q. What was the size of the cave?

21 "A. Twenty-four feet long, twelve feet
22 wide, and nine feet high, and this cave was full of
23 ammunition and provisions, mostly ammunition.

24 "Q. Before December 1941 did the Japan-
25 ese ever practice shooting their big guns?

1 "A. Only to test them.

2 "Q. Was the searchlight built into a
3 cave?

4 "A. It was built on a platform and covered
5 over with canvas.

6 "Q. Did they have any other equipment
7 close to the searchlight?

8 "A. They had a range finder.

9 "Q. On the Island of Otte what did they
10 have there beside guns and searchlights?

11 "A. They had a warehouse there in which
12 they kept ammunition and provisions.

13 "Q. Did you see the provisions and ammuni-
14 tions?

15 "A. Yes.

16 "Q. What did they have on the island of
17 Salat beside the searchlight and guns?

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1 "A. A warehouse for ammunition and provisions.

2 "Q. Was all this construction on Otta and Salat
3 prior to December 1941?

4 "A. Yes.

5 "Q. During 1939, 1940, and 1941, prior to the
6 war, did the Japanese ever mention waging a war
7 against the United States?

8 "A. Yes.

9 "Q. What did they say?

10 "A. We are going to install fortifications and
11 military installations before we start the war a-
12 gainst the United States.

13 "Q. Did you have to furnish help for the con-
14 struction on the island of Otta?

15 "A. We were forced to furnish thirty men during
16 1939 for the construction on Otta for approximately
17 five months. These men were paid eighty sen per day.

18 "Q. Did you have to furnish help for the con-
19 struction on the island of Salat?

20 "A. We were forced to furnish thirty men per
21 day for construction of installation on the island of
22 Salat for approximately six months. The men re-
23 ceived eighty sen per day."

24 I offer in evidence I.P.S. Document No.
25 6014, being the deposition of Sona Monukit.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

2 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's Document
3 No. 6014 will receive exhibit No. 898.

4 (Whereupon, the document above men-
5 tioned was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 898
6 and received in evidence.)

7 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now read an
8 excerpt:

9 "Taken at: Moen Island, Truk and Central Car-
10 olinas.

11 "Date: February 25, 1946.

12 "Q. State your name, permanent home address,
13 and occupation.

14 "A. Sona Monukit, assistant chief, Tol Island.

15 "Q. How long have you lived on the island of
16 Tol?

17 "A. Forty-eight years.

18 "Q. How long have you been living in the Truk
19 Atoll?

20 "A. Forty-eight years.

21 "Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications
22 or military installations constructed by the Japanese
23 on the island of Tol prior to December 1941?

24 "A. Yes.

25 "Q. State what you know of your own knowledge

1 about these installations.

2 "A. During 1939 on the southwest section of
3 South Tol a road was built from the dock to the top
4 of the hill. Around the edges of the top of the hill
5 three gun emplacements were installed and three guns
6 appearing to be about eight inches in diameter in-
7 stalled there. A platform was erected and a search-
8 light affixed thereon. A reinforced concrete cave
9 in which ammunition was stored was dug in the side of
10 the hill. Two barracks were built for the Japanese
11 soldiers. During 1940 on the northern tip of North
12 Tol a concrete wharf was constructed and a road from
13 the wharf to the top of the mountain. At the top of
14 the mountain one barrack and two warehouses were
15 built. A concrete platform was built and a search-
16 light placed thereon. Two gun emplacements were con-
17 structed and guns installed appearing to be about
18 four or five inches in diameter and a radio station
19 built."

20 I offer in evidence I.P.S. Document No. 6015,
21 being the deposition of ATER ERA.

22 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

23 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's docu-
24 ment No. 6014 will receive exhibit No. 899.

25 (Whereupon, the document above men-

1 tioned was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 899
2 and received in evidence).

3 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now read an
4 excerpt from ATER ERA's deposition.

5 "Taken at: Moon Island, Truk and Central
6 Carolines.

7 "Date: February 25, 1946.

8 "Q. State your name, permanent home address,
9 and occupation.

10 "A. Ater Era, chief, Fefan Island.

11 "Q. How long have you lived on the island of
12 Fefan?

13 "A. Forty-nine years.

14 "Q. How long have you been living in the Truk
15 Atoll?

16 "A. Forty-nine years.

17 "Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications
18 or military installations constructed by the Japanese
19 on Fefan Island prior to December 1941?
20

21 "A. Yes.
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1 "Q State what you know of your own knowledge
2 about the installations.

3 "A On the island of Fofen during the year of
4 1940 the Japanese constructed a road from the dock
5 on the east side of the island to the top of the
6 mountain. Emplacements for two guns were built and
7 guns appearing to have bores of about five inches
8 were installed. A searchlight was placed there on a
9 platform and a generator placed inside a small build-
10 ing. Three large buildings were erected, one used as
11 a barracks and two for warehouses.

12 "Q Do you know the names of any of the persons
13 in command or in charge while the building was going
14 on prior to December 1941?

15 "A Iwai, Japanese Navy, was one of the officers
16 in charge during that period."

17 I offer in evidence I.P.S. Document No.
18 6016, being the deposition of MICHUO NACHEUO.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

20 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
21 No. 6016 will receive exhibit No. 900.

22 (Whereupon, the document above
23 mentioned was marked prosecution's exhibit
24 No. 900 and received in evidence.)

25 ERICADIER QUINN IAM: I will now read an

1 excerpt from the deposition.

2 "Taken at: Moen Island, Truk and Central Carolines.

3 "Date: February 25, 1946.

4 "Q. State your name, permanent home address, and
5 occupation?

6 "A. Michuo Nachuo, chief, Dublon Island.

7 "Q. How long have you lived on the island of
8 Dublon?

9 "A. About twenty-five years.

10 "Q. How long have you been living in the Truk
11 Atoll?

12 "A. Twenty-five years.

13 "Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications or
14 military installations constructed by the Japanese
15 on this island prior to December 1941?

16 "A. Yes.

17 "Q. State what you know of your own knowledge
18 about the installations.

19 "A. About the middle of 1941 on the island of
20 Dublon on the east side on top of a hill the
21 Japanese commenced construction. They built two
22 barracks, two warehouses, and one radar station.
23 Concrete emplacements were set and three guns,
24 appearing to be six-inch guns, were installed there.
25 A platform was erected and a searchlight placed there.

1 "On the south side of Dublon a fuel dump was
2 established. Close to the fuel dump one large
3 cave was dug and concrete reinforced.

4 "This was used to store ammunition and pro-

1 visions. No other fortifications or military instal-
2 lations were erected prior to December 1941.

3 "Q Do you recall any other installations estab-
4 lished before December 1941?

5 "A A lookout tower was built before December 1941
6 and wireless communication established with Japan.

7 "Q Do you know of any military installations
8 and fortifications constructed before December 1941
9 on other islands thereabout?

10 "A Yes.

11 "Q What island?

12 "A Eten.

13 "Q What was built there?

14 "A During 1937 on the island of Eten the Japan-
15 ese built an airfield. A platform was erected and a
16 searchlight placed there. A concrete emplacement for
17 one large gun was constructed and a gun about five
18 inches in diameter was placed thereon. They also in-
19 stalled machine guns, a radar station, and dug three
20 caves, reinforced them with concrete and stored ammuni-
21 tion and provisions in the caves."
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1 The next seven depositions, may it please
2 the Tribunal, are made by residents of islands in
3 the Marshall group.

4 I offer in evidence IPS Document No. 6030,
5 being the deposition of Ferdinand Z. Emiz.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
8 No. 6030 will receive exhibit No. 901.

9 (Whereupon, the document above referred
10 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 901
11 and received in evidence.)

12 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now read an
13 excerpt from the deposition of Ferdinand Z. Emiz:

14 "Date, 14 March 1946.

15 "I, Ferdinand Z. Emiz of Wotje Atoll,
16 Marshall Islands, being duly sworn, depose and say
17 that I am now employed as an interpreter at Naval
18 Air Base No. 3234, Majure Atoll. I was attending
19 school in Japan until 1938 when I returned to the
20 Marshall Islands, Jaluit Atoll.

21 "Affiant further states that in August, 1938,
22 he went to Wotje Atoll and was employed as an assis-
23 tant to a surveyor who was taking measurements of
24 the different islands. The Japanese commenced con-
25 struction on the airfield at Wotje in June 1939.

1 About fifty Japanese laborers worked on this job.
2 The complement there called for three officers and
3 five chiefs. Three hundred natives were hired to
4 construct a Japanese prison camp. Natives were paid
5 one yen a day. Construction of the prison camp was
6 completed in October, 1939, and the same month
7 prisoners came from Japan to finish their sentences
8 in the Wotje prison camp. After the arrival of the
9 Japanese prisoners all native labor with the excep-
10 tion of ten men and five women were returned to
11 ORNEY island, Wotje Atoll.

12 "Affiant further says that in November,
13 1939, all trees on Wotje island, Wotje Atoll were cut
14 down so that the airfield could be constructed.
15 About this time all prisoners (over two thousand)
16 were returned to Japan and about one thousand Koreans
17 and about two thousand Japanese laborers arrived at
18 Wotje to continue the work on the airstrip. Native
19 laborers were again drafted through the headmen of
20 each island.

21 "Affiant further says that he saw large
22 quantities of cement, asphalt and other construction
23 material being delivered at Wotje island, Wotje
24 Atoll for use on the airstrip."
25

I offer in evidence IPS document No. 6032,

1 being the deposition of ABISA.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
4 No. 6032 will receive exhibit No. 902.

5 (Whereupon, the document above referred
6 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 902 and
7 received in evidence.

8 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now read an excerpt
9 from the deposition of Abisa:

10 "I, ABISA, of Imej Island, Jaluit Atoll,
11 Marshall Islands, being duly sworn, depose and say
12 that I am now employed at the Native Labor Unit, Naval
13 Air Base, Navy No. 3234. In 1938 the Japanese hired
14 natives to cut trees on IMEJ island, Jaluit Atoll to
15 make a place for the air field. There were two
16 divisions of native working parties. One would work
17 on gun emplacements and the other on the pier. These
18 would be rotated. The Japanese Navy paid Yen 1.50
19 per day and the Japanese Company Yen 1.20 a day. The
20 Company was in charge of all supplies for the Japanese
21 Navy and supplied natives to work for the Japanese
22 Navy. Before the war the natives that were paid Yen
23 1.50 a day had to buy their own food. Others were given
24 food by the Navy."

25 I offer in evidence IPS document No. 6031, being

1 the deposition of LANEN.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
4 No. 6031 will receive exhibit No. 903.

5 (Whereupon, the document above referred
6 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 903 and
7 received in evidence.)

8 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now read an excerpt:
9 "Date, 16 March 1946.

10 "I, LANEN, Maloelap Atoll, Marshall Islands,
11 being duly sworn, depose and say that I am now em-
12 ployed in the Native Labor Unit, Naval Air Base, Navy
13 No. 3234. In 1939 I was living on Maloelap Atoll and
14 in that year three hundred Japanese and four officers
15 came to Tarawa Island on Maloelap. They put to work
16 fifty natives to remove trees for an airfield. A little
17 later five hundred more Japanese came from Japan.
18 Eighty more natives were given work. The Japanese
19 made the natives work from 6.00 AM to 5.00 PM for 85
20 sen a day. The natives worked at cutting down trees
21 and making concrete. The trees were carried by four
22 men to a specific place. Natives were also used to
23 carry heavy loads of sand from the beach to the air
24 strip. If the native did not work to suit the Japan-
25 ese he would be beaten. The Japs sent people with

1 broken limbs to the hospital but those who had internal
2 injuries were not taken care of at the hospital. The
3 airfield was finally completed in 1941 but barracks
4 for the soldiers and other buildings were not completed."

5 I offer in evidence IPS document No. 6029,
6 being the deposition of AJIDRIK.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

8 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
9 No. 6029 will receive exhibit No. 904.

10 (Whereupon, the document above referred
11 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 904 and
12 received in evidence.)

13 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: (Reading)

14 "Date, 15 March 1946.

15 "I, AJIDRIK, of Laura Island, Majuro Atoll,
16 Marshall Islands, being duly sworn, depose and say that
17 I am employed as an Interpreter at Naval Air Base,
18 Navy No. 3234. In the year 1940 I was living on
19 Laura Island, Majuro Atoll. In that year the Japanese
20 started to cut down trees on RITA, Island, Majuro Atoll
21 to make an airfield. The Japanese did not pay for the
22 trees they destroyed as they promised to do. This air-
23 field was never completed. About the middle of 1941
24 the Japanese started to take all men from Majuro Atoll
25 to Mille, Malloelap and Jaluit Atolls to work on the

1 bases. Force was used in securing labor and those who
2 did not wish to go were told that they would be put in
3 prison or they would be threatened with a beating."

4 I offer in evidence I'S document No. 6010,
5 being the deposition of JOHANIZ.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
8 No. 6010 will receive exhibit No. 905.

9 (Whereupon, the document above referred
10 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 905 and
11 received in evidence.)

12 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: (Reading)

13 "March 12, 1946.

14 "1.Q. State your name and title.

15 "A Johaniz, Chief of Eniwetok tribe,
16 Eniwetok Atoll.

17 "2.Q Have you been Chief of your tribe from
18 January 1941 to the present time?

19 "A Yes.

20 "3.Q. When did the Japanese marines arrive on
21 this atoll.

22 "A In January, 1942.

23 "4.Q. When did the Japanese navy arrive.

24 "A April 27, 1941."

25 I offer in evidence IPS document No. 6011,

1 being the deposition of ABREAM.

2 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
4 No. 6011 will receive exhibit No. 906.

5 (Whereupon, the document above referred
6 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 906 and
7 received in evidence.)

8 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: (Reading)

9 "Date, 12 March 1946.

10 "1.Q State your name and title.

11 "A Abream, Chief of Engebi tribe, Eniwetok
12 Atoll.

13 "2.Q Have you been Chief of your tribe from
14 January 1941 to the present time.

15 "A Yes.

16 "3.Q When did the Japanese Marines arrive
17 on this atoll.

18 "A In January, 1942.

19 "4.Q. When did the Japanese Navy arrive.

20 "A April 27, 1941."

21 As the last deposition, I offer in evidence
22 IPS document No. 6028, being the deposition of LAJINA.

23 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

24 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
25 No. 6028 will receive exhibit No. 907.

1 (Whereupon, the document above referred
2 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 907 and
3 received in evidence.)

4 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: (Reading)

5 "Date, 16 March 1946.

6 "I, LAJINA, of Mille Island, Mille Atoll,
7 Marshall Islands, being duly sworn, depose and say that
8 I am now employed at the Native Labor Unit, Naval Air
9 Base, Navy No. 3234. I was living on Mille Island,
10 Mille Atoll in 1941 when in June of that year the Japan-
11 ese brought 3000 Koreans and Japanese laborers there
12 and started to build an airfield. First they cut down
13 the trees. Native labor was used for which the Japan-
14 ese paid 85 sen a day. Native labor was used to cut
15 down trees, mix concrete and to unload the ships which
16 brought all kinds of material from Japan."

17 That concludes the depositions and I will
18 now offer in evidence IPS document No. 2378A.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

20 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, may the
21 record show that prosecution's exhibits 883 to 907,
22 inclusive, are affidavits and not depositions as
23 characterized by the prosecution?

24 THE PRESIDENT: According to the Australian
25 terminology, those in the form of questions and

1 answers would be depositions, but what does it matter?

2 MR. LOGAN: According to our practice, as your
3 Honor may know, a deposition is a document where both
4 sides appear and each asks questions. An affidavit is
5 just where one makes the interrogations.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Ordinarily a deposition is
7 taken before a magistrate.

8 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now offer in
9 evidence prosecution's document No. 2378A. This is a
10 file of correspondence which was obtained from the
11 office at Honolulu of the well-known Japanese Shipping
12 Company generally known as the N.Y.K. The file, which
13 comprises correspondence between the Head Office of
14 the Company and the Company's Branches, refers to the
15 policy adopted by the Company under secret instructions
16 from the Japanese Navy and Foreign Ministries of refus-
17 ing to carry non-Japanese nationals to the Mandated
18 Islands.

19 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

20 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
21 No. 2378A will receive exhibit No. 908.

22 (Whereupon, the document above referred
23 to was marked prosecution's exhibit No. 908 and
24 received in evidence.)

25 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I will now read the

1 correspondence, excluding, however, the descriptions
2 of the writers of the letters and the offices to which
3 they were addressed, but identifying the letters by
4 their numbers and dates.

5 I should like to direct attention, if the
6 Tribunal please, to the certificate of Commander Maxon
7 attached to the document showing how the documents
8 came into possession of the International Prosecution
9 Section.

10 THE PRESIDENT: I suggest you read them after
11 the recess, Brigadier. We will recess now for fifteen
12 minutes.

13 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was taken
14 until 1500, after which the proceedings were
15 resumed as follows:)
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AGENT: Brigadier Quilliam. East is now resumed.
BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May it please the Tri-
bunal, I will proceed with the reading of the cor-
respondence in exhibit -- in the N.Y.K. file.
"No. 185, March 28, 1933.
"Re: Deferring the booking of passengers de-
siring to go to places in Inner South Seas Area.

"Lately, there has been a tendency toward the
increase in the number of foreigners deciding to go to
the islands in the Inner South Seas area, but since
the facilities of this line are not only not suited
in many respects to accommodate foreign passengers,
but also the hotel facilities of the South Seas area,
in general, are not suited to accommodate foreigners
and since considerable inconveniences are apt to be
experienced in case of stop-overs because of the poor
shipping connections (besides, occidental meals aboard
ships of this line may be wholly abolished), we would
like to advise you not to book any foreign passenger,
if possible, for the South Seas line until further
notice.

"If obliged to do so, secretly inform whoever is
in charge to accept applications only after they have

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"As
you understand it.

"As indicated in the Passenger Department's out
Passenger, South Seas Branch #185, dated March 28,
1933 (copy sent to you), every effort is being made
not to accept foreign passengers for this line.
Taking this into consideration, we suggest that you
politely refuse this application.

"This is to affirm receipt of your telegram.

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Brigadier Quilliam.

4 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May it please the Tri-
5 bunal, I will proceed with the reading of the cor-
6 respondence in exhibit -- in the W.Y.K. file.

7 "No. 185, March 28, 1933.

8 "Re: Deferring the booking of passengers de-
9 siring to go to places in Inner South Seas Area.

10 "Lately, there has been a tendency toward the
11 increase in the number of foreigners deciding to go to
12 the islands in the Inner South Seas area, but since
13 the facilities of this line are not only not suited
14 in many respects to accommodate foreign passengers,
15 but also the hotel facilities of the South Seas area,
16 in general, are not suited to accommodate foreigners
17 and since considerable inconveniences are apt to be
18 experienced in case of stop-overs because of the poor
19 shipping connections (besides, occidental meals aboard
20 ships of this line may be wholly abolished), we would
21 like to advise you not to book any foreign passenger,
22 if possible, for the South Seas line until further
23 notice.

24 "If obliged to do so, secretly inform whoever is
25 in charge to accept applications only after they have

1 been first approved by the proper authorities."

2 "#115

3 "Oct. 14, 1935

4 "Re: Ban against accenting foreign passengers
5 for South Seas line.

6 "We acknowledge receipt of your wire, dated
7 October 7, as follows:

8 "'-----please reserve 1st class 2 outside two-
9 berth cabins Kasuga Maru 12th December from Yokohama
10 Jaluit thence to Palao also Yamashiro Maru 17th Janu-
11 ary Palao Menado.'

12 "We believe that the above was made in reference
13 to the schedule of last year, but in reply, we sent
14 the following wire, dated the 11th, as follows:

15 "'Referring to your telegram of 7th N.Y.K. South
16 Sea Island Line no accommodation available until March.'

17 "As you have already received it, we believe that
18 you understand it.

19 "As indicated in the Passenger Department's out
20 Passenger, South Seas Branch #185, dated March 28,
21 1933 (copy sent to you), every effort is being made
22 not to accent foreign passengers for this line.
23 Taking this into consideration, we suggest that you
24 politely refuse this application.

25 "This is to affirm receipt of your telegram.

1 "As an actual problem, in accepting a foreigner,
2 even if he is a resident of the South Seas, it is
3 necessary for us to give notice of his name, age,
4 occupation, nationality and so forth, to the South
5 Seas Government, which confers with the Navy and
6 Foreign Ministries and directs us either to accept
7 or not to accept the application.

8 "Such being the case, we cannot accept any appli-
9 cation unless approved by the proper authorities. As
10 indicated in the aforementioned letter, we advised
11 you 'to secretly inform whoever is in charge to
12 accept applications only after they have been first
13 approved by the proper authorities.' Hence, appli-
14 cation merely by wire is of no use and even if an
15 application is accompanied by a detailed letter, it
16 is not certain that the approval of the proper author-
17 ities can always be obtained. Instead, it is believed
18 that they have been rejected in the majority of cases.

19 "Although there may be some business reasons, it
20 would be wise to make it a general rule not to book
21 any passenger for the South Seas line at agencies
22 abroad.

23 "As reference, we are sending you a copy of
24 Passenger, South Seas Branch #185."
25

"#121

"Oct. 26, 1935

"Re: Ships sailing in February and March, 1936,
on South Seas line.

"In regard to the above, we acknowledge receipt
of the inquiry from the American Board of Commissioners
for Foreign Missions of Boston through your letter
dated September 28.

"However, as indicated in the circular, Passenger,
South Seas Branch #185, dated March 28, 1933, we have
adopted a policy of not accepting foreign passengers
for this line and since the schedule is of practically
no use as a schedule because of the frequent changes,
we have stopped sending schedules of this line to our
foreign agencies, lately. However, we are sending
you a copy for reference.

"Through circular, Passenger, South Seas Branch
#115, dated the 14th of this month and addressed to
employees of Chicago (copies sent to all branch
officers in America), we advised that all overseas
branches make it a general rule not to handle passen-
gers for this line, but since the missionaries of the
American Board, Boston, which has made the inquiry,
engage in missionary work throughout the South Sea
Islands and frequently make round trips between Japan

1 and the islands, Rev. Harold W. Hackett, representa-
2 tive of the above-mentioned American Missionary society
3 in Japan and residing in Kobe, handles their passages.
4 He seems to have a considerable number of friends in
5 the government offices concerned. Hence, even if
6 you do not handle their booking, we are sure that they
7 will not experience any inconvenience. We are mention-
8 ing this for your reference.

9 "Furthermore, since the matter concerning South
10 Seas line and foreign passengers is a very delicate
11 problem and the actual reasons cannot be frankly re-
12 vealed to the foreign agents, who thus might make
13 useless and irrelevant inquiries, it is suggested
14 that you make arrangements to have only Japanese
15 employees handle problems pertaining to the South Seas
16 line and foreign passengers and to have all corres-
17 pondence written in Japanese."
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1 "#129

2 "November 4, 1935

3 "Re: Ban against booking occidental passengers for
4 South Seas line.

5 "As stated in the circular, Passenger, South
6 Seas Branch #185, dated March 23, 1933, no foreign
7 passenger is to be booked for this line, if possible.
8 However, there has been a trend, lately, for two or
9 three branches abroad to apply for cabin reservations
10 by wire or to order English schedules of this line
11 for distribution. Hence, we are again listing the
12 reasons for the difficulty of booking foreign passen-
13 gers for this line and seeking your cooperation in
14 this non-acceptance policy.

15 "1. General reason.

16 "The meals aboard ships of this line are of
17 Japanese standard and will not satisfy foreigners
18 because only Japanese foods are served, breakfasts
19 and suppers. Also, there are no hotel facilities in
20 the South Seas, in general, to accommodate foreigners.

21 "2. Special reasons (secret).

22 "The year before last, we received a secret
23 order from the South Seas Government office to the
24 effect that if an application for passage aboard this
25 line is received from a foreigner, regardless of the

1 fact that he is a resident of the South Seas, said
2 application should not be accepted until his name,
3 age, residence, occupation and so forth have been re-
4 ported to and approved by the said government office.

5 "With the receiving of the above-mentioned
6 report, the South Seas Government confers with the
7 Navy and Foreign Ministries and directs us either to
8 accept or not to accept the application, but to ob-
9 tain approval appears not to be an easy task, for
10 absolutely no foreigner, regardless of whether he
11 is a resident of the South Seas or not, is accepted
12 during naval manouvers (which sometime last over
13 several trips).

14 "From the standpoint of national policy, the
15 above measure is necessary, but since the authorities
16 concerned cannot directly handle the policy of approv-
17 ing (or disapproving) entry of foreigners to the is-
18 lands because of the international situation, their
19 entry is being controlled indirectly through our firm
20 although it is a great deal of trouble to us. Besides,
21 since the schedule for this line is often changed for
22 governmental reasons, the schedule is apt to be of no
23 use. Such being the case, it may cause you some dif-
24 ficulties in dealing with your clients, but it would
25 be a wise policy for agencies, particularly those in

1 far off places, not to handle passengers for the South
2 Seas line.

3 "The above being the case, we desire all
4 publicity in regard to this line cancelled, have
5 stopped the publication of the English schedule (List
6 No. 12) and the English guide (List No. 53) of this
7 line. Since the mentioning of the latter in this de-
8 partment's English circular, P. Ad. No. 77, dated
9 March 15 of this year, and pertaining to the necessary
10 amount of advertisement and printed matter for next
11 (this) year, was a mistake, please abstract it from
12 your copies.

13 "Since the above mentioned special reasons
14 are matters that should not be revealed to your
15 foreign passenger agents and since without this infor-
16 mation they cannot be expected to carry out their
17 work fully in dealing with passengers, it is sugges-
18 ted that you make arrangements to have only Japanese
19 employees handle problems pertaining to foreign pas-
20 sengers for the South Seas line and to have all cor-
21 respondence written out in Japanese."

22 "#347

23 "July 28, 1936

24 "Re: Advertisement of South Seas Line in August issue
25 of Travel Bulletin.

1 "As we have been repeatedly directed to re-
2 fuse all applications for passage on the South Seas
3 line when applied for by foreign passengers, we find
4 it difficult to understand the reasons for the publi-
5 city given to conditions in South Sea Islands and the
6 ships with excellent passenger facilities in the
7 Travel Bulletin, our magazine for foreigners. As
8 long as there is no special reason, we would like to
9 request that arrangement be made to withhold publica-
10 tion of items pertaining to this line in the future.

11 "Today, for example, a passenger desiring
12 to book passage on that line appeared at our office.
13 We had a difficult time in dealing with him and even
14 our foreign agent, regretting his inability to supply
15 sufficient information in spite of the existence of
16 such a new line, suggested that we send a wire to
17 you inquiring about the schedule and the existence
18 of vacancies.

19 "However, explaining to him the useless-
20 ness of sending such a wire because of the frequent
21 change of schedule of the said line according to con-
22 ditions in Japan, the complete booking of cabins by
23 Japanese passengers on every voyage, the existence
24 of no hotel facilities in the South Seas and the pro-
25 paration of meals aboard ship according to Japanese
taste, I refused the application of the said passenger."

1 I don't think I need read that letter, may
2 it please the Tribunal. I will just refer to the
3 reference in the last paragraph. (Reading):

4 "No. 50, April 8, 1937.

5 "Re: Mailing of revised South Seas line pas-
6 senger rate schedule.

7 "The revised passenger rate schedule for this
8 route, which has been sent to and is awaiting the
9 approval of the South Seas government at present, is
10 being sent to you (one set enclosed; ten sets under
11 separate cover). Hence, use it as stated below, as
12 though it had been approved. However, for caution's
13 sake, we would like to add that the out trip rates
14 for Osaka-Kobe-Moji-Yokohama run of all lines and
15 the out trip rates for the Osaka-Kobe-Moji-Kulung-Naba
16 run and the return trip rates for the Naka-Kobe run
17 of the Saipan line have not been changed and are the
18 same as stated in the notification, Passenger, South
19 Seas Branch #183, dated December 21, 1936."

20 I will omit the next paragraph and go on to
21 the last. (Reading):

22 "To overseas branches:

23 "The above is being disseminated for reference,
24 and the restriction against accepting foreign pass-
25 engers has not been changed, as notified previously."

1 "No. 211, Mar. 13, 1939.

2 "Re: Ban against accepting foreign passengers
3 for South Sea line.

4 "In regard to this matter, instructions were
5 given in Passenger, South Seas Branch #185, dated
6 March 28, 1933, and in Passenger, South Seas Branch,
7 #129, dated November 4, 1935, but in view of the
8 current trend of increase in the number of foreigners
9 desiring passage to Inner South Sea Islands, it is
10 desired that further attention be given to the fol-
11 lowing items;

12 "1. As a general principle, do not accept
13 foreigners for this route. If a foreigner is to be
14 accepted, send in the application with the details
15 of the Passenger Department of the main office for
16 approval.

17 "2. As reasons for refusal, state that the
18 ships on this route are not equipped to accomodate
19 foreigners in regard to facilities and meals and that
20 there are no vacancies at present.

21 "3. Point out the fact that there is no hotel
22 equipped to accomodate foreigners in the Inner South
23 Seas Area.

24 "4. When information is obtained in regard to
25 foreign passengers planning to tour Inner South Seas,

1 refer to this directive and notify the branch .
2 offices concerned."
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1 Further evidence of Japan's policy of excluding
2 foreign nationals from the Islands and, it is submitted,
3 of the military and naval preparations which she was
4 making there, is contained in pages 64, 65 and 66 of Court
5 exhibit No. 58. These are papers relating to the foreign
6 relations of the United States and Japan. I will read,
7 if the Tribunal please, those pages.

8 "Telegram

9 "The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in
10 Japan (Grew). (Paraphrase).

11 "Washington, June 13, 1936.

12 "For several years now the Government of Japan
13 has requested each year that the American Government ex-
14 tend facilities in its territorial waters off the Alaskan
15 coasts to two Japanese Government ships and permit their
16 entry into harbors in Alaska and in the Aleutian Islands
17 that are not open, ordinarily, to foreign commerce. In
18 the case of one of the vessels in question it was stated
19 that its purpose in visiting these waters and harbors was
20 the making of studies in connection with protection of
21 fur-bearing seals; in the case of the second vessel, how-
22 ever, it was not suggested that the visits would be made
23 on basis of any treaty or formal arrangement between the
24 American Government and the Government of Japan. The
25 Government of the United States has acceded, nevertheless,

1 to the requests of the Government of Japan in this
2 regard.

3 "A strong undercurrent of suspicion and con-
4 jecture has existed for some time past over harbor
5 developments or fortifications in possessions which
6 both Japan and the United States have in the Pacific.
7 No objection to the visits of Japanese Government vessels
8 to the territorial waters and closed harbors of Alaska
9 has been made by this Government, as it was believed
10 that the opportunities which were given in this way for
11 observation by Japanese vessels would serve to remove
12 any suspicion which the Government of Japan might hold
13 that any improvements have been made of such a nature
14 as would violate either the letter or the spirit of the
15 naval treaty signed on February 6, 1922.

16 "In our view, it is unfortunate that the Gov-
17 ernment of Japan so far has not adopted an attitude
18 similarly liberal in the face of allegations that in the
19 Japanese mandated islands of the Pacific improvements
20 are being carried out which are irreconcilable with
21 Japan's treaty obligations not to fortify those islands.
22 We can understand that the Government of Japan should
23 be reluctant to give any countenance to irresponsible
24 allegations, but nevertheless, that Government un-
25 doubtedly shares with the Government of the United States

1 the view that persistent suspicion, with regard to this
2 matter, is provocative of mutual distrust, and that such
3 suspicion, therefore, should be dispelled.

4 "The American destroyer Alden will be sent
5 shortly to the Asiatic station according to the Navy De-
6 partment plans. The Japanese Government will thus have
7 presented to it an opportunity to extend to a vessel of
8 this Government courtesies at the larger unopened ports
9 of the Pacific mandated islands, as well as at the open
10 ports. An invitation by the Government of Japan for the
11 Alden to visit those ports would have, in our opinion,
12 highly beneficial results from the point of view of re-
13 lations between the two nations.

14 "Please consider carefully and attentatively
15 our views as we have sketched them. If no objection is
16 perceived, please present these views informally and
17 orally to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, putting for-
18 ward the suggestion outlined in the foregoing paragraph
19 as on your own initiative.

20 "Inform the Department currently by telegraph.

21 "Hull."

22 "Telegram

23 "The Ambassador in Japan (Crew) to the Secretary
24 of State. (paraphrase). "Tokyo, July 8, 1936.

25 "Today I made suggestions, as on my own initia-

1 tive, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs with regard
2 to an invitation to the Alden to visit open and unopened
3 ports in the Pacific islands under Japanese mandate.

4 "Marked interest was shown by the Minister in
5 the situation as I described it, but he professed not
6 to know anything at all about the subject. He told me
7 that he would see what there was that could be done and
8 that he would try to give me, before July 20, the re-
9 sults of his inquiries.

10 "Grew."

11 "Telegram

12 "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secre-
13 tary of State. (Faraphrase). "Tokyo, July 28, 1936.

14 "At the request of the Vice Minister for For-
15 eign Affairs, the counselor of the Embassy called on
16 the Vice Minister to discuss certain questions that
17 had been broached by the Ambassador to the Minister for
18 Foreign Affairs. One of these questions related to
19 the possibility of the visit by the Alden to ports in
20 the Japanese mandated islands. This call was the only
21 opportunity that presented itself for discussion of the
22 matter since the visit of the Ambassador on July 8.

23 "The Vice Minister stated that the suggestion
24 of the Ambassador had been referred to the Ministry of
25 Overseas Affairs but that no reply had been received."

1 He further stated that there would probably be con-
2 sultation with other government departments. In re-
3 sponse to a query by the Counselor, he expressed the
4 fear that the Foreign Office had no way of expediting
5 the reply.

6 "The manner of the Vice Minister was friendly,
7 but it indicated that the Foreign Office could do
8 nothing further.

9 "Grew."

10 "Telegram

11 "The Acting Secretary of State to the Amba-
12 sador of Japan (Grew). (Paraphrase).

13 "Washington, August 7, 1936.

14 "Embassy's telegram No. 163, July 28, 1 p.m.,
15 with regard to the suggestion made relative to the
16 Alden, the Department assumes that there is no prospect
17 that the Japanese authorities will take favorable action.
18 In reply to a communication from the Japanese Embassy
19 here, the Department is today returning an adverse answer
20 to that Embassy's request that the Japanese Government
21 training ship Shintoku Maru be permitted to enter a
22 Hawaiian harbor which is not listed as a port of entry."

23 "Phillips."
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1 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: It is now desired to
2 tender for identification only IPS document No. 794.

3 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
4 No. 794 will receive exhibit No. 909 for identifica-
5 tion only.

6 (Whereupon, the document above re-
7 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No.
8 909 for identification.)

9 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: I now offer in evidence
10 IPS document No. 794A, being an excerpt from IPS
11 document No. 794. By an order made by the Tribunal
12 on 4th October (Paper No. 453) compliance with Rule
13 6 (b) (1) of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure was
14 dispensed with. IPS document No. 794A is a record of
15 a meeting of the Privy Council held on 20th January
16 1937 at which a decision was made to enable Naval
17 Officers to be appointed as Administrators of the
18 South Sea Islands for the purpose, it is submitted,
19 of the furtherance of the plans for fortifying the
20 Mandated Islands.

21 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

22 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
23 No. 794A will receive exhibit No. 909-A.

24 (Whereupon, the document above re-
25 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit

1 No. 909-A and received in evidence).

2 BRIGADIER QUILLIAM: May it please the
3 Tribunal, it is not proposed to read the first two
4 pages which contain the names of those present at the
5 meeting, but it should be pointed out that the fol-
6 lowing defendants attended: HIRANUMA, President of
7 the Privy Council; HIROTA, who was then Prime Minister;
8 NAGANO, who was then Navy Minister. I will read pages
9 3 and 4 of the document.

10 "The President (HIRANUMA): Next we shall in-
11 troduce the bill regarding the special appointment of
12 administrative officials of the South Seas Govern-
13 ment. The first reading shall be held immediately
14 and omitting the recitation of the bill we shall
15 have the investigation report.

16 "Reporter (MURAKAMI):

17 "Upon investigating this bill prudently, we find
18 that the South Seas Government, in conformity with a
19 fixed plan covering several years, is executing
20 various measures concerning the expansion of coloniza-
21 tion, promotion of industries and good organization of
22 communications for the purpose of developing the
23 South Sea Archipelagoes that are under its jurisdic-
24 tion. In view of the fact that the South Sea
25 Archipelagoes have come to hold an important position

1 at this time in the national defense of the Empire
2 in the light of the recent international situation,
3 and because there are many installations concerned
4 with the navigation routes, harbours, roads, aviation
5 and communications of the said archipelagoes, which
6 will require a special consideration of the
7 archipelagoes, convenience and military circumstances
8 of our Navy, it is necessary to provide a way to
9 enable the special appointment of naval officers as
10 the administrative officials who are to be in charge
11 of the transportation and communication affairs in
12 the said government.

13 " In order to establish a way for making such
14 special appointments we wish to provide through the
15 Imperial Ordinance concerning this bill that the
16 administrative officials of the South Seas Government
17 who will be engaged in the communication and cor-
18 respondence affairs, may be appointed after being
19 selected by the Higher Civil Service Examination Com-
20 mittee from among those who are well versed in the
21 affairs of the South Seas and who possess the nec-
22 essary knowledge and experience for the duty thereof.
23 And in appointing the naval officers in active ser-
24 vice as administrative officers in the South Seas
25 Government in accordance with this provision, a special

1 rule will be established through the Imperial
2 Ordinance concerning this bill in order to prevent
3 them from being subjected to the restriction of
4 rank of senior civil officials and be lowered in their
5 official ranks. The rule will provide that in case
6 of appointing a higher official on duty for the
7 administrative office of the South Seas Government
8 in accordance with the aforementioned rule of appoint-
9 ment, his rank will be made an exception in accordance
10 with the Senior Civil Service Official Transfer Rule.
11 That is, if a captain in the Navy, he may be immediately
12 appointed as the administrative official of the South
13 Seas Government with the 3rd rank of the higher civil
14 service. However, in case the person who is appointed
15 as above later becomes a high official in another
16 capacity, it is natural that he becomes a subject to
17 the restriction on official ranks fixed by Imperial
18 Ordinance No. 285 of the 36th year of Meiji (1903),
19 and, therefore, we wish to stipulate in the ordinance
20 concerning this bill that he be regarded as the
21 Special Civil Official mentioned in the said Imperial
22 Ordinance, and thereby make the above ordinance ap-
23 plicable to him.

24 "The point is that this bill, because of special
25 necessity, chiefly aims to set a rule of special

1 appointment for those of the staff who are high
2 officials who will have to be put in charge of spe-
3 cial business in the South Seas Government, and at
4 the same time it also proposes to lay down adequate
5 rules regarding their official rank, which I deem is
6 an unavoidable measure, and therefore I think it is
7 proper to pass it as it is."

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1 If it please the Tribunal, that is all the
2 evidence it is proposed to tender at this stage on
3 this aspect of the case, but Admiral Richardson in
4 the testimony to be given by him later in the case
5 will give some additional evidence relating to this
6 aspect.

7 My colleague, Captain Robinson, will now
8 present evidence in connection with Japan's Naval
9 Preparation for War.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Captain Robinson.

11 CAPTAIN ROBINSON: Mr. President and Members
12 of the Tribunal: It is now proposed to present evi-
13 dence to show Japanese naval preparations for wars
14 of aggression, as charged particularly in Counts 1 to
15 30, and specifically in Appendix A, Section 5-a.
16 Documentary evidence will now be presented to show
17 Japanese naval opposition to ratification of the
18 London Naval Limitation Treaty of 1930.

19 I present to the clerk IPS document No. 1124.
20 It is a book entitled "Minutes of the Committee
21 Meetings for the Year 1930, Secretariat of the Privy
22 Council." The certificate of the Secretary of the
23 Privy Council is attached. I request that the clerk
24 give to this IPS document a Court exhibit number for
25 identification only.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
2 No. 1124 will receive exhibit No. 910 for identifica-
3 tion only.

4 (Whereupon, the document above re-
5 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
6 No. 910 for identification.)

7 CAPTAIN ROBINSON: I now offer in evidence
8 an excerpt from this Court exhibit. The excerpt, in
9 English text, consists of 42 pages. It is the minutes
10 of the first to the thirteenth meetings of the In-
11 vestigation Committee for the Ratification of the
12 London Naval Treaty of 1930. The dates of the meetings
13 extend from 18 August 1930 to 26 September 1930.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

15 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
16 No. 1124A will receive exhibit No. 910A.

17 (Whereupon, the document above re-
18 ferred to was marked prosecution's exhibit No.
19 910A and received in evidence.)
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1 CAPTAIN ROBINSON: I shall read extracts
2 from court exhibit No. 910-A. It is first to be
3 observed that the accused HIRANUMA is listed as
4 present at each of these meetings, serving in the
5 capacity of Vice-President of the Privy Council.

6 I shall now read from page 9, bottom para-
7 graph of court exhibit 910-A:

8 "Councillor KANEKO charged that it is very
9 unfortunate that the former as well as the present
10 Cabinet regards the Privy Council as an enemy, and
11 added that according to the newspapers the Adminis-
12 trative Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, NAGAI, in
13 his speech at the oratorical meeting of the MINSEI TO
14 held at Hibiya Public Hall on August 20th, stated as
15 follows: 'If the Privy Council interferes with the
16 ratification of the London Treaty, which the Cabinet
17 intends to conclude for the sake of promoting inter-
18 national peace and to lighten the national burden,
19 we must fight them as the public enemy of our nation.'"

20
21 I shall now read from page 17 of exhibit
22 910-A, the third paragraph -- page 16 is the first
23 insert; page 16, the third paragraph on page 16:

24 "Councillor KAWAI asked what the Premier
25 meant when he answered in the Lower House that the
Government would be solely responsible for national

1 defense. The Premier answered that he had just replied
2 that it was unnecessary to discuss in the Diet the
3 details of the negotiations between the military
4 administration organization and the military command
5 organization; and that as the Navy General Staff was
6 not responsible to the outside, the Government would
7 be responsible. The said Councillor again asked on
8 what grounds the Premier had, regardless of the
9 objection of the military, decided that the military
10 strength decided upon by the Treaty was sufficient
11 for our national defense; and what he meant when he
12 said that the strength decided upon by the present
13 agreement was only a part of our country's military
14 strength. The said Councillor continued to ask about
15 the authority possessed by the Chief of the Navy
16 General Staff; and how the Premier could say, with
17 a military strength of which the Chief of the Navy
18 General Staff did not approve, that our national
19 defense was secure. The Premier replied to each of
20 these questions."

22 Now, at page 17, the middle paragraph:

23 "After this the same Councillor (KAWAI)
24 pointed out that the Premier's explanation in the
25 Privy Council was quite different from that which he
had made in the Diet where he had stated that the

1 Government held the right to decide military
2 strength. The Premier answered that he had not
3 stated that the Government held the right of decision,
4 but he had only said that the matter of concluding
5 treaties should be decided by the Cabinet. He answered
6 also that he could not state the scope and extent to
7 which he took the military's opinion into considera-
8 tion, as this was a confidential matter. Whereupon,
9 the same Councillor asked how the Premier could explain
10 that agreement had been reached when the matter re-
11 quired agreement by the military. The Premier ex-
12 plained that it was because he had thought that the
13 military had had no objection after all."

14 I shall next read from page 20, the bottom
15 paragraph, and continuing with the top paragraph on
16 page 21:

17 "Then Councillor KAWAI asked to be allowed
18 to speak, stating that he desired to bring the ques-
19 tions he had been asking for some time now to a con-
20 clusion, but as the Chairman said that there would be
21 a further chance of reviewing the questions some
22 other day, the said Councillor stated that it was
23 simply beyond his comprehension that the Navy Minister
24 should say in his reply in the House of Peers that the
25 age when the strength of force determines all had

1 already passed, and advocate that the most important
2 point as regards armaments lay in keeping them in a
3 perfect state at all times. He argued that Japan's
4 armaments should be based upon the possibility of
5 a crisis in the peace of the Orient with America or
6 other Third Powers intervening in Sino-Japanese
7 relations over rights and interests in Manchuria and
8 Mongolia, and demanded to know the Government's opinion
9 on the matter.

10 "To this, the Premier replied that it was a
11 fact that the ratio of strengths, vis-a-vis America,
12 provided in this treaty would become more unfavorable
13 for Japan the nearer we got to 1936, and therefore it
14 would be quite natural that he /Councillor KA'AI/
15 should worry about Japan's national defense, provided
16 that it was interpreted in a narrow sense, but, the
17 Premier continued, he believed that friendly relations
18 with other Powers, financial adjustments and other such
19 matters were likewise the essentials of national de-
20 fense. Therefore, although he too was dissatisfied
21 with some phases of the national defense he was deter-
22 mined to put up with the present state of things for
23 the time being; and although we would have to bear
24 with the unfavorable ratio till the end of 1936, we
25 would be able to build ships from the beginning of 1937,

1 and so we had better make preparations within the
2 scope admitted by the treaty. If we commenced our
3 ship-building simultaneously with the expiration of
4 the treaty terms, we would soon be able to hold 70%
5 as against America; and finally the Premier asserted
6 that it was a groundless fear that America would raise
7 trouble in China, taking advantage of the period when
8 the ratio would be low for our country."

9 Turning to page 25, the middle paragraph,
10 the second main paragraph:

11 "The Navy Minister replied that if the treaty
12 failed to be concluded, then the United States would
13 be hostile to Japan and there would be no guarantee
14 that she would not undertake direct competition with
15 our country in warship construction; that although
16 the ratio against the United States in the 8-inch
17 gun cruiser class would fall to 60% and the cruisers
18 would be of old age, as pointed out by the Councillor,
19 and no one could say that no trouble would occur then,
20 it was not true that 6-inch gun cruisers could not
21 necessarily stand up against 8-inch gun cruisers. He
22 added that some admirals even asserted that they cou'd
23 successfully sink one 8-inch gun cruiser with four
24 destroyers."
25

I turn to page 29 of the minutes, the bottom

1 paragraph of page 29:

2 "Councillor KANEKO said that, according to
3 the report of the United States Senate, what the
4 United States fears most is submarines, and therefore
5 the more the number of Japanese submarines was re-
6 duced, the more powerful the United States would
7 become. Stating that as long as Japan possessed sub-
8 marines, there was nothing to be afraid of from the
9 United States, that world peace and international
10 faith were merely outward courtesies, and that peace
11 was untenable without repletion of military strength,
12 he discussed the indispensability of submarines."

13 I turn to page 34, the bottom paragraph on
14 page 34:

15 "Councillor KUBOTA expressed opinion that
16 for national defense, wealth and diplomacy were neces-
17 sary in addition to military power, and although
18 knowledge and spirit were most essential, yet there
19 was no other way to settle international disputes but
20 to resort to arms in the end. Japan's importance
21 today in the world lay in her military power alone.
22 The London Conference was where Britain and the United
23 States gave expression to their avarice under the fine
24 names of universal peace and the lightening of burdens,
25 but they were only afraid of Japan's military power. "

1 "Such being the situation, he said, he was most con-
2 cerned over the recent question of the Supreme
3 Command and thought it was essential that the Navy
4 Minister and the Navy Chief of Staff come to an
5 agreement in deciding the military strength. There-
6 fore, upon hearing that the Minister concerned had
7 replied in his recent instructions that the two had
8 come to an agreement he was greatly relieved."

9 I shall quote two more extracts, page 35,
10 the middle and bottom paragraphs: This is Councillor
11 KANEKO talking.

12 "Japanese-American relations would be at
13 their most dangerous point about 1937. The United
14 States would most certainly purchase the South
15 Manchuria Railway in cooperation with China and would
16 attempt to drive Japanese influence out of Manchuria
17 and Mongolia. Such being the case, it was extremely
18 important to supplement the lack of military strength
19 caused by the London Treaty. Justice, he said, was
20 only superficial courtesy between nations, and the
21 last resort was military power alone. That Japan could
22 abolish extra-territoriality was due entirely to the
23 Sino-Japanese War. On the other hand, the Netherlands
24 which had once been known as the world's wealthiest
25 country had fallen today to the position of a third-rate

1 country because of the limitation of her armaments.
2 That a small country like Japan could advance into the
3 world as one of the Five Great Powers was due entirely
4 to the military men. The Treaty of Portsmouth was also
5 a reward of Japan's military's victory."

6 And the concluding paragraph at the bottom
7 of that page:

8 "As the Japanese military system was character-
9 istic of Japan, being based on the Japanese fighting
10 spirit, soul, and national structure, it should be
11 perfected to the last. On the basis of the speeches
12 made in the United States Senate there could be no
13 doubt that the London Treaty was a preparation for
14 pressure against Japan after 1936."

15 I now present to the Clerk IPS document No.
16 891. This is a book entitled, "A Record of the Privy
17 Council Concerning the Ratification of the London
18 Naval Treaty of 1930," dated 1 October 1930. The
19 certificate of the secretary of the Privy Council is
20 attached. I request that the Clerk give this document
21 a court exhibit number for identification only.

22 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
23 No. 891 will receive exhibit No. 911 for identification
24 only.
25

(Whereupon, the document above

1 referred to was marked prosecution's
2 exhibit 911 for identification.)

3 CAPTAIN ROBINSON: I now offer in evidence
4 an excerpt from court exhibit No. 911, marked for
5 identification only. The excerpt in its English trans-
6 lation consists of twenty-four pages. It is the
7 record of the conference of the Privy Council regard-
8 ing the Imperial ratification of the London Naval
9 Treaty of 1930, held on Wednesday, 1 October 1930.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

11 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution's document
12 No. 891-A will receive exhibit No. 911-A.

13 (Whereupon, the document above
14 referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit
15 No. 911-A and was received in evidence.)
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1 CAPTAIN ROBINSON: I shall read the following
2 extracts from Court exhibit No. 911-A. It is first
3 to be observed that the accused HIRANUMA is listed
4 as present at the meeting in the capacity of Vice-
5 President of the Privy Council. I shall now read from
6 page 13 of the document; page 13 middle paragraph.

7 "No. 4 (HAMAGUCHI): I should now like to
8 state briefly the opinion of the Government on today's
9 problem of ratification of the London Naval Treaty.
10 The object of the London Naval Treaty, as has just
11 been reported by the Chief of the Investigation
12 Committee, is to prevent the danger of competitive
13 armament for the sake of world peace, and to reduce
14 the burden of taxes; and this treaty has been signed
15 and sealed by the representatives of the Five Powers --
16 Japan, Britain, the U.S., France and Italy. As far
17 as successful in an agreement on the limitation of
18 auxiliary ships which had not been realized at the
19 Washington and Geneva Conferences, and have been
20 able to put a limitation on every type of ship."

21 I shall now read from page 18, the bottom
22 paragraph:

23 "No. 5 (TAKARABE): The first point of your
24 question seems to be, when did the so-called three
25 great principles come into existence, which did not

1 exist in 1927/Showa 2/, at the time of the Geneva
2 Conference. Of course, there was no such thing as the
3 three great principles at the time of the Geneva
4 Conference. To be precise, even at the last conference,
5 they have neither been clearly implied in the instructions
6 given to the plenipotentiaries nor have they been
7 formally declared. Why, then, have there been rumors
8 about them?"

9 Next, the following page, the bottom of page
10 19 next to the bottom paragraph:

11 "The so-called three great principles are
12 concerned with the military strength necessary for
13 the execution of the plan of operations based on the
14 national defense policy decided in 1923/Taisho 12/.
15 Thus, the three points - 70 per cent in total, 70
16 per cent in cruisers with 8-inch guns, and the present
17 strength in submarines - were instructed. No mention
18 was made as to which of the three would be the more
19 important, and the expression 'the three great principles'
20 was not used in any of the official documents. Just
21 because these three were the main points in our demands,
22 people called them the three great principles. The
23 navy has always attached importance to them.

24 "As has been explained by Councillor ISHII,
25 we had failed to accomplish our demand of 70 per

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1 cent in capital ships at the Washington Conference,
2 and it was decided at 60 per cent; and also at the
3 Geneva Conference our strength in auxiliary ships
4 was set at 60 per cent in the provisional compromise
5 draft between Japan and Britain. Accordingly, our
6 Naval authorities, after years and years of investigations,
7 were well aware of the difficulties in carrying through
8 our demand of 70 per cent. In view of these former
9 experiences, they had instructed our plenipotentiaries
10 with the three great principles, for the first time,
11 just before the opening of the last Conference.
12 Prepared to fight with their backs against the wall,
13 they put every effort into obtaining the understanding
14 of the whole nation. For this purpose, young officers
15 made trips to various places and gave lectures,
16 greatly emphasizing the importance of the three great
17 principles. Some of them seem to have pushed their
18 arguments to extremes by stressing that it would
19 mean the ruin of our nation if we would fail to
20 accomplish these principles. These were all manifesta-
21 tions of their patriotic spirit, and as a result,
22 the public opinion was thoroughly unified. I believe
23 this has had much to do with our success at the Conference
24 in obtaining the ratio of 70 per cent in total tonnage."
25

And a final quotation at page 22, beginning

1 with the main paragraph:

2 "No. 4 (HAMAGUCHI): As regards the London
3 Treaty, there had been, prior to its being referred
4 to the Privy Council for deliberation, various
5 rumors in public about the influence it will have
6 upon the political world, and some mischievous
7 elements, in line with these rumors, had been spreading
8 a number of wild tales. For this reason, there were
9 indications that unrest had been arising in the political
10 and financial worlds. The treaty was referred to
11 the Privy Council for deliberation on July 24, and
12 after preliminary investigations by the Secretariat
13 of the Council, it was brought before the Investigation
14 Committee which convened for the first time on
15 August 18. Since then more than fifty days had passed
16 till September 17, and the meeting of the Committee
17 had been held twelve times during that period.
18 Meanwhile, the newspapers in Tokyo, not being informed
19 of the proceedings of the Investigation Committee
20 which had been kept secret, indulged in conjectures
21 and published a number of articles. Readers, ignorant
22 of the circumstances, would either harbor suspicions
23 about the destiny of the treaty, or would be sceptical
24 about a probable discord between the Privy Council
25 and the Government. Various organizations, taking

1 advantage of this situation, began one after the
2 other to attempt mischief-making; and among the various
3 articles, there were some that could be classified
4 as reprehensible. They were openly or secretly
5 distributed to various quarters, and every means
6 of alienation and slander were attempted. This
7 being the situation, it was impossible for people
8 to discriminate truth from falsehood and good from
9 bad. As a result, it is a fact that cannot be concealed,
10 that the general public was driven to an indescribable
11 sort of unrest and unhappiness. Even if it were not
12 so, public feeling today is apt to lack stability and
13 self-possession, and it is deplorable that such a
14 condition should long continue.

15 "As long as the destiny of this treaty
16 remains undecided, it will not only be impossible
17 to eradicate this type of unrest, but it is evident
18 that there will be a tendency for the unrest in public
19 feeling to gradually increase, incited by daily
20 articles in newspapers and all the other scandalous
21 propaganda. The problem of the financial world in
22 particular, is what the Government cannot help but
23 be mostly concerned about."

24 I shall now offer in evidence documents to
25 show Japanese naval activities in opposition to the

1 Naval Limitation Treaties, mainly the Washington
2 Treaty of 1922, the London Treaty of 1930 and the
3 London Treaty of 1936.

4 Documentary evidence will now be presented
5 from Court exhibit No. 58 already in evidence -- Court
6 exhibit 58, I believe it is before the Court-- pages
7 1 to 63, which include pages 249 to 306 of Volume I,
8 State Department papers relating to the foreign
9 relations of the United States and Japan, 1931-1941.

10 I shall read first at pages 5 to 9, the
11 communication from the United States Ambassador,
12 Joseph C. Grew, to Secretary of State, Cordell Hull,
13 dated at Tokyo, 15 September 1933:

14 "Sir:"--

15 THE PRESIDENT: This is a rather long letter.
16 I think you had better read it in the morning, Captain.
17 We will adjourn now until half past nine tomorrow
18 morning.

19 (Whereupon, at 1558, an adjournment
20 was taken until Friday 1 November 1946, at
21 0930.)
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